Executive Summary
GARD I Report
June 23rd – 25th, 2001

Conclusions

*While adjusting to the changed international landscape, the three countries have to meet demands for reform and restructuring.

The principal theme of the initial GARD discussions was that of transition; these three nations, as most of the industrialized world, are still in the process of post-Cold War transition. The central features of their international landscape have changed dramatically; yet the way to the future, even in the medium term, seems uncertain and still hemmed in by historical legacies, popular pre-conceptions and the over-optimistic assumptions of the early 90s. Each of the three states faces a demanding domestic agenda of reform and restructuring. Each, too, confronts a minimalist popular consensus for foreign policy in general, and for dramatic external policy changes in particular.

*Pragmatism is triumphant in leadership styles.

The dominant operational code for the leadership in each country is pragmatism predominantly leading to short-term reactions to external events and domestic priorities. For the medium and long term, this reflects a lack of vision but also no sense of great urgency, political or economic. Domestic elites seem similarly content with ad-hocism, with no greater appetite for changes beyond those that increase national prosperity and insure stability and order. Restructuring the international community, along lines similar, say, to the radical departures planned after World War II, seems neither necessary nor desirable.

*Maintaining consistent ideological paths or dictates is more difficult now; ad hoc styles and the avoidance of overarching principles are the preferred response.

In all three countries there are now multiple converging factors that foster pragmatic or at least non-ideological political leadership. These factors include for example the insistant role of the media in foreign policy agenda setting, the growing transparency of societies, the pressure of instantaneous electronic communications on decisionmaking, and the “marketization” of international interactions reflecting the primacy of markets and global economic interchange.

*After a phase of little mutual interest, Russia and Europe now concentrate on the long-term goal of “integrating” Russia into European structures.

Russian-European relations represent one of the few areas (the others are missile defense and ties to China) where there are fundamental changes in train. Europe, and indeed the Union as a whole, were long of secondary interest for a superpower Russia focused on defining itself vis-à-vis the United States. The German-Russian relationship was a special “love-hate” case, intensified by bargaining over German unification in the early 90s. In the last two years, both Europe and Russia have worked hard at the rhetoric of a new relationship but with more than token implementation still to come. The agreed long-term goal is now a Russia “integrated” into European structures, particularly in areas of special mutual interest, security and trade/investment.

*But, in order to attain this goal, Russia and Europe still have to find an appropriate and feasible degree or form of Russian integration.

Expectations from either side differ especially on the question of the necessity, prospect, and benefit of an “integrated” Russia in European structures. The question is whether the EU should solely offer an orientation to Russian policy and political development, or should it offer incentives or even assurances, as is often demanded by Russia. The latter clearly contradicts the idea of Europe. Europe in the eyes of Europeans is a competitive process. On the other hand, the EU enlargement process creates political implications on the future of the European political and security structure. Given this effect, Russia will feel even more marginalized from the processes of common European decision making. Western policy makers need to recognize that, in contrast to the case of the Eastern European candidates, both the discipline and the stimulus of the possibility of candidacy will be missing. The handling of certain domestic issues, and democratization in general is to a great extent dependent on the question of whether Russia remains outside the borders of an enlarged European Union or if it will have the perspective of being “integrated” into European structures. Therefore, there must be further incentives for Russia in order to harmonize the political and economic transformation process in accordance with EU requirements.

See also GARD I program

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