Executive Summary
GARD II Report
October 7th – 9th, 2001

Conclusions

*Perspectives after September 11th

On the one hand, the terrorist attacks of September 11th activated a immediate discussion on how states should react to the new threat, and how cooperation between states will be affected in a short-term outlook.

On the other hand, and on a more global scale, it raised discussions about the root causes and breeding grounds of international terrorism, and furthermore about the shape and agenda of a future global security system. Is, after September 11th, the nature of the state at stake or does the new situation demand state action more than ever?

The design of the anti-terrorist coalition lead by the United States does not constitute a new model for further international cooperation on overarching and common threats. Assuming that fighting global dangers requires more than plain state action, a system of collective security governance which asks for a variety of mechanisms and tools is needed.

*Therefore: How to manage collective governance? The problem of agency.

Questions deriving from the global perspective: who are the appropriate actors to address the upcoming challenges? Which role should states and non-state actors play? Which tools are the most effective for collective response?

Furthermore, the international community must change its behavior towards already existing governance mechanisms. In the past, states gave evidence to highly permissive action regarding the non-compliance of international rules and norms.

Politicians today have to draw more attention to new configurations of actors, groups, and flows that exist beyond the traditional definition of the state and classical concepts of governance. They increasingly have to deal with actors in the shape of networks in constant flux rather than being unitary. Not only the shape, but also the actors’ changing environment, like increasing cultural diversity between and within states, requires new tools and concepts in addressing these new challenges effectively.

*There is a window of opportunity for low cost changes in international interaction and coalition building and there are new prospects for defining new priorities in international cooperation over the next ten years.

But, especially American participants understood the building of flexible coalitions over time in the counter-terrorist campaign as the most important task at present.

Still, it has to be assessed whether the impact of September 11th is likely to lead to long-term, more structural and institutional changes on the international level and enhanced multilateral cooperation with regard to other global challenges, such as fighting poverty, environmental issues, banning land mines, promoting the court of international justice, and others. In contrast, some expected more isolationist and unilateral policies, because of national reflexes and calls for a stronger role of the state.

*Re-shaping US-Russia Relations: Between Euphoria and Reality.

The new situation after September 11th presents a unique opportunity to transform relations between the two countries. Euphoria on both sides about closer cooperation should be avoided, as a joint counter-terrorism effort will probably be conducted over older, still existing contentious issues that might lead to a mismatch between rhetoric and wishes.

The major task is to recognize that there is a window of opportunity; yet, both sides need to be aware of the possibilities and limitations of this window:
One existing obstacle to a successful cooperation remains Russia’s integration into the international community. As long as Russia feels excluded from international decision-making, interaction in other fields will continue to be problematic.

But, a closer cooperation could also cause a “second order difficulty”: increasing concerns of third parties about growing US-Russian cooperation. Ukraine, Georgia, or the Baltic States could worry about becoming bargaining chips in bilateral relations between the United States and Russia. Other countries that have to be involved in a counter-terrorist campaign, like China or Usbekistan, could try to impose their own definitions of terrorism on the global coalition as their trade-off for cooperation.

Thus, what kind of international integration or participation is needed? Certainly, a serious form of “accommodation” as a pre-step to integration must be provided in order to enhance real reforms. With regard to Russia’s integration into WTO, it is still disputable whether WTO accession will accelerate or slow down economic reforms. Although in the past 1-1/2 years the economic situation in Russia improved, WTO opening might still be to early at the current stage of transition.

*Searching for an organizing principle: “Think big”.

There was already a chance for progressive and open-minded approaches to international politics in 1991. However, promising approaches collapsed within six months and policy-makers started to “think small” again. The return to the traditional security structures and modes of action was mainly driven by dominating state actor inertia.

Now, there is another chance to “think big” since the terrorist attacks have called more attention to the necessity of common action in global politics. Global governance in economic terms, however, confronts the international community with a multitude of problems, mainly in terms of investment and integration. Within this complex system, regulating flows on the basis of global agreements is needed; yet, an over-control of economic markets bears the risk of drying out regular economic activities.

*New Roles for the Media

In general, the increase in the quantity of information and the multitude of sources does not necessarily lead to increased quality of the information provided. Furthermore, proliferation of new sources creates negative effects by creating competition on the audience and leading to media and political populism.
Examining the function of and the processes within the media in Western societies, profit-driving forces in mass media are very evident. Both the commercialization of the media and the increase of available news and information are driven by modern consumerism and characterize the information society today. Mass media tends to create virtual or material realities often leaving no other choice for politicians than to act according to the atmosphere generated by the media. The Western public, on its part, has learned to consume news instantly without reflecting on its urgency in comparison to its importance. This leads to a spiral of action and reaction. Furthermore, politics are reduced to symbolic representation; journalism is dramatized.

Thus, is a new “professionalism” or “professional conscience of journalists” as well as a new management culture on the part of the media owners is necessary.
The Russian case: Struggle over independence

Alliances between business and the media as well as between media tycoons and politicians might purport basic similarities in all three countries; but the implications of these alliances for the role of the media in society are different in the West and in Russia. In terms of agenda-setting, the Russian media doesn’t have as much power as the Western media. The main agenda-setter is the executive authority that in turn channels information to the public. During the past ten years, Russian media has in fact influenced the minds of the audience. But today, Russian media is again more dependent on the federal authorities than it was in the early 1990’s. In contemporary Russia the “securitization” of information and the restriction of information becomes increasingly important to the state.

See also GARD II program

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