Executive Summary
GARD III Report
August 5, 2002

Conclusions

*There is and will continue to be a fundamental difference in the European and American approach to terrorism.

The US sees military intervention as paramount and a first step towards conclusive peace. Their own experience and their view of the international community led European participants to reject this as the first choice except in extreme circumstances. Europeans wanted to look deeper to find the root causes of the conflict, i.e. globalization, and to try to develop cooperative integrative strategies to deal with these problems. Russia and the United States have been close partners since 9/11, and from the American perspective, Russian cooperation is key to coalition building and united war efforts.

*NATO expansion is no longer on the top of the transeurasian political agenda; EU expansion now looms larger.

Europe has become even more inward looking and totally absorbed with its own limited political and economic agenda. There was a more fundamental evidence of European unwillingness to take Russia seriously found in the continuing discussions about the status of Kaliningrad, soon to be a Russian enclave surrounded by EU (and NATO) members. The recurring debate over the details, even the minutiae, of visas, subsidies, and customs seem to mask (or perhaps act as a stalking horse for) more critical issues: Was Russia part of Europe? Would it ever be accepted as an equal in decision-making? How would it be compensated as its former allies and present trading partners were incorporated into an ever more integrated European system?

*Europeans accuse America of a unilateralist power acting without the consent of allies and seeing military intervention as the solution to any global problem; the US accuses Europe of ignoring the most crucial world security threats and of too much bureaucracy making it almost impossible to reach crucial military decisions, citing Kosovo as a good example of poor leadership.

For the last ten years world order has been in transition, with the US eventually and even somewhat reluctantly assuming primacy. The principal task for all three states in the coming decade is to sort this out, to retain those elements of alliance and converging interests that are possible while recognizing and channeling the preponderance of American power, both military and economic. Russia under Putin's firm westward direction has adjusted better than Europeans or others (e.g., the Chinese) to the role of a preponderant America; at present, the strongest leg of the triangle is Russian-US political relation.

*With much reluctance, there is an acceptance by U.S. allies on the future strategy on Iraq.

Iraq remains an issue where there is dissention within the triangle. Europeans strongly disagree with use of military force to replace Saddam Hussein. Russia is somewhat more accepting of inevitable US action. But it may base its assent (or is it, some suggested, toleration) to an eventual American or Anglo-American attack on the promise of consultation and further lifting of economic disadvantage.

*Trade relations between Germany-Russia-America are at a cranky stage.

Russia’s current concern is assessing the risks and benefits of becoming a WTO member. Russian-European trade relations are plagued with differences in norms; exactly how to liberalize markets and trade between Russia and Europe is still being debated with no easy solutions in sight. US-European trade relations are also strained, most recently manifest in the US steel industry. More importantly, the US is now seen as the source of economic problems. Again, just how exactly to solve major trade disputes, whether through the WTO or bilateral negotiations, remains unclear.

See also GARD III program

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