Market Allocation of Force and the Prospects for Global Security Professionals

Deborah Avant

While there are many features of conflict that are changing, one that is rising in importance is who is using force. Increasingly in the last 15 years, the use of force has been privatized. This has occurred via both the private delivery of military and security services by commercial companies (they go by many names – private security companies, private military companies, privatized military firms, etc.) and the private financing of security by commercial companies, NGOs, and other non-state organs.

Consider the recent experience in Iraq as an example. When the US defeated the Iraqi Army in 2003, at least one out of every ten people deployed to the theater in the conflict were civilian employees of private security companies (PSCs) performing work that used to be done by soldiers. As lawlessness followed the fall of Saddam Hussein and US forces were stretched thin an “army” of private security forces surged into the country – to train the Iraqi police force, the Iraqi army, a private Iraqi force to guard government facilities and oil fields, and simply to protect expatriates working in the country. In May 2004, well over 20,000 private security personnel were in the country (making private soldiers the second largest member of the “coalition of the willing”). These personnel ranged from fuel haulers from KBR, to military trainers from MPRI, to police trainers from DynCorp, to private guards from Erinys, to personal security details from Blackwater.

These private security personnel hailed from countries as varied as Fiji, Israel, Nepal, South Africa, El Salvador, Chile, Japan the United Kingdom and the United States. They were employed by more than 25 different PSCs – incorporated in countries as varied as the US, the UK, France, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. These companies worked not only for governments (like the US or the UK) or government created entities (like the Coalition Provisional Authority) but also for private firms (like oil and construction companies), the media (like NPR and ABC News) and international non-governmental organizations (like CARE and RTI) in that country. Though personnel working for ABC News were not critical for military operations, they were armed and did operate in the same areas as troops. Though some fuel haulers for Halliburton were not armed, they were critical for military operations – and, as the insurgency mounted, increasingly at personal risk. Some Blackwater troops were armed, performed critical missions for coalition forces, and operated at great risk – as indicated by the dramatic deaths in Fallujah and elsewhere. As the demand for private security services grew in Iraq, a local security industry emerged – in some cases causing militia groups to turn themselves into PSCs to cash in on contracts for security services.

Iraq is not unique – it is only the latest manifestation of a trend toward the privatization of security that mushroomed in the 1990s. This trend has created a market for force that exists along side and intertwined with both more traditional state forces on the one hand, and criminal and militia groups, on the other. This market intensifies questions about whether the institutional infrastructure that has developed around the use of force can offer control – or even categorization (of legitimate versus illegitimate force, for instance) of today’s forces.

Leaving aside for a moment those who are skeptical that this market will have much of any impact at all, there are two predominant views on the subject. Some have suggested the market will feed in to grim predictions about the future where the control of force for any purpose becomes less and less possible, while others have suggested that it holds great potential as a tool by which the international community might more effectively use force for its purposes through the creation of global security professionals. I submit that there are theoretical and historical reasons to believe that both paths are possible, and thus suggest that research attention be directed toward exploring the conditions likely to yield the more optimistic (and avoid the more pessimistic) scenario. Below I outline one view of these conditions as well as some hurdles that may make their attainment more difficult.

Private (Global) Security Professionals?

In a nutshell, what we often view as “effective” control over force is the situation where forces deliver a wanted (needed) function according to political processes and undergirded by values that a collective views as legitimate. It is no accident that civil military relations scholars have focused on professionalism as the key to control of force; Weber’s notion of rational legal authority from which our notions of effective control come is very much wrapped around ideas about professionalism.

I argue that forces are most likely to act professionally when they believe they will be effective taking that action, they will be rewarded for taking that action and taking that action is the right thing to do. In other words, when the control mechanisms sociologists often attend to – such as norms, standards, and education – and those economists often attend to – such as screening, selection, monitoring, incentives and sanctions – reinforce one another – we are most likely to see forces as in control.

Military professionalism within advanced industrial states has increasingly enshrined values drawn from theories of democracy (civilian control of the military and abidance by the rule of law), liberalism (respect for human rights), and the laws of war. Standards for behavior based on these principles are reinforced in military and police education and fostered by international bodies like the ICRC. Although these values operate more or less consistently (with each other and with the norm of sovereignty) in many western states, there is potential tension between them. As liberal values have become codified in international agreements, they have, in principle, circumscribed the sovereign authority through with civilian control over violence often works. Most clearly this is seen in the results of the International Tribunal at Nuremburg, which found that when international rules protecting humanitarian values come in conflict with state laws, individuals are obligated to transgress the laws of their government (except when there is no room for “moral choice”). Individual military personnel cannot escape criminal responsibility for actions that violate international law by citing civilian orders. This can be cited as a budding global standard for military professionals.

How much hold we expect this standard to have on behavior, though, should depend on the degree to which it consistently directs behavior, whether those that abide by the standard are viewed as effective or not, and whether they are rewarded or sanctioned.

Two general features that are associated with the privatization of security – the importance of market mechanisms and the diffusion of control over violence – change the potential for control mechanisms will work together to reinforce a global professional standard for security forces or compete with one another to allow a broader range of behavior. Also, some of the very processes that have led to the rise of private security have also drawn into question the political process by which force should be legitimately authorized and whether abiding by prevailing norms will lead to military effectiveness.

Market Mechanisms and Diffusion of Control: Potential Challenges to Prevailing Norms

The most effective controls for PSCs are through the market. The control of violence issued by PSCs, then, accrues not to superiors in a hierarchical sense (for instance, leaders nested in electorates), but to consumers.

Consumers are those who pay – potential for consumer mechanisms to allocate control over violence to those who pay the most.

The ability of consumers to choose is affected by the level of competition in the industry and the flow of information.

Transient nature of contracts and services may make it harder to link behavior to firms.

Those who pay are both states and non state actors – to what degree will these different types of consumers come to agreement about what constitutes legitimate behavior or legitimate authorization?

If they do not, competing norms should weaken hold of any norm on behavior.

The proliferation of actors willing to break the rules to escape their weak position – sub-state, transnational, or otherwise non-state actors (militias, paramilitaries, local or transnational crime syndicates, even weak states) who participate in violent activity creates pressures for forces (whether private or not) to believe that abiding by international norms will reduce rather than enhance effectiveness.

When what is appropriate and what is functional appear to diverge, the hold of norms should weaken. The market pressures on PSCs should lead this weakening to happen even more quickly in the private sector. After all, it is through the delivery of a function that these organizations establish professional authority at all. The availability of market options may allow leaders of democratic states to take actions with less domestic support.

Potential Tools for Encouraging Private Professionals:

Reinforce/translate standards for current conditions

Translation of international humanitarian law from reliance on state vehicles to non-state vehicles

ICRC approach

Big question: Will powerful states, particularly the US endorse this?

Coordination among consumers

UN could play a role

As could strong consumers (US, extractive industries – but need a collective forum or some procedures to bind powerful – both to bind them and to convince others of their motivations)

Big question: Will the US and other powerful actors endorse this?

Delegation to “accrediting” agencies

Akin to medical profession, legal profession – some body like the ICRC could accredit PSCs that abide by international humanitarian law

Sanctioning devises – seal of approval, decertification, etc.

Big question: Will these efforts be supported or undermined by the US and other powerful consumers?

Networks of professionals

Individuals who expect to operate among the same groups of PSCs and NGOs over time may worry about their individual reputation in ways that solve some of the problems with the transient nature of contracts.

Big question: As size of the private sector grows, can these networks work?

Legal forums – adjudication and enforcement of rights and responsibilities

Geneva Conventions and the status of PSC personnel

Whose laws and which forum should be used to hold PSC personnel responsible for misbehavior?

Pressing area for future work

Issues beyond the reach of professionalism:

No matter how professional, private forces may still work to change security from a public good to private good

Private “professionals” can nonetheless undermine collective security

Personal security details and problems with counterinsurgency in Iraq

Legitimate authority over force is still open to question.