

**The Collective Dynamics of Racial Dehumanization and  
Genocidal Victimization in Darfur**

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# **The Collective Dynamics of Racial Dehumanization and Genocidal Victimization in Darfur**

## **Abstract**

Sociologists empirically and theoretically neglect genocide. Our critical collective framing perspective begins by focusing on state origins of race based ideology in the mobilization and dehumanization leading to genocide. We elaborate this transformative dynamic by identifying racially driven macro-micro-macro level processes which are theoretically underdeveloped and contested in many settings. We investigate generic processes by exploiting an unprecedented survey of refugees from the ongoing genocide in Darfur. Our focus is on the Sudanese government's crisis framing of a dehumanizing collective process. Sudanese forces joined with Janjaweed militia to attack black African settlements. They aggregated and concentrated racial epithets in a collective process of dehumanization and organized terror which amplified the severity of genocidal victimization, the lethal and lasting scar of the genocidal state. Our findings question primordial and counter-insurgency explanations, while supporting aspects of the instrumental, population-resource, constructionist and cognitive perspectives that form the foundation of our critical collective framing perspective. It is more than fifty years since Sutherland famously added white collar crime to public sociology, radically reordering discourse about crime. It is time to do the same with Raphael Lemkin's concept of genocide.

## **The Collective Dynamics of Racial Dehumanization and Genocidal Victimization in Darfur**

“We are Sudanese living in our homeland. We have no problem with the Sudanese government. They became our first enemy, they do not protect us. They want to kill all the black people. Why? I can ask myself, and also ask you.”

Darfurian Refugee in Chad Camp

### **The Sociology of Genocide**

While genocide is now widely discussed by journalists and lawyers, it is still neglected, marginalized, and under theorized by sociologists. Horowitz (1980:3) speculates that sociologists feel “a studied embarrassment about these issues, a feeling that intellectual issues posed in such a manner are melodramatic and unfit for scientific discourse.” Fein similarly insists (1990:7; still in 2007:1) that “the primary deterrent is our own inhibitions and lack of boldness.” There are further methodological difficulties posed by the unpredictability of genocides, the devastation of whole groups and places, and the participation and cover-ups by governments.

Accounts of genocide nonetheless assume fundamental sociological processes. These descriptions often emphasize dehumanization that is framed in terms of race, ethnicity, religion or nationhood. This process usually is depicted as collectively driven - as led by groups and leading to group destruction. Yet there are few quantitative analyses of these social aspects of genocide. This paper investigates genocide in the context of Sudan, not because this time or place is unique, but because for the first time in history the U.S. government collected detailed data on racial dehumanization and inter-group violence during the ongoing Darfur genocide. This allows us to address the fundamental question: How is racial genocide accomplished?<sup>1</sup>

Brubaker and Laitin (1998:427) argue more broadly that “the most fundamental questions- for example, *how* the adjective ‘ethnic’ modifies the noun ‘violence’ - remain unclear and largely unexamined” and that the answers require analysis of “the forms and dynamics of ethnicization.”<sup>2</sup> We make a similar argument about racialization and dehumanization. The Sudanese state instigated a collective framing process that dehumanized its victims - black Africans in Darfur - and resulted in genocide. While the details are case specific, we cite parallel processes and illustrations from other genocides. In Darfur, the dehumanization involved racial epithets (e.g., “you are slaves,” “kill the slaves,” “this is the last day for blacks”) and resulted in violent victimization that we analyze using survey interviews about attacks on black African villages. We show that the role of race is prominently denied in this genocide, as it often is historically.

The role of the state in activating racial dehumanization leading to genocide is essential to our critical collective framing theory.<sup>3</sup> The Sudanese government mobilized local Arab Janjaweed militia using a racial framing to motivate much of the death and destruction. Our critical collective framing theory argues that this racial targeting was the socially constructed and critically contingent mechanism that mediated the influence of population-resource competition on genocidal victimization. We build on Katz’ (1988) account of the role of cursing in the “righteous slaughters” of intimates and acquaintances. We hypothesize that racial epithets played a parallel role in transforming individual motivation and intent into collectively organized dehumanization and violence. More specifically, we hypothesize that the aggregation and concentration of racial epithets during attacks created a collective effect that intensified the severity of genocidal

violence. Collective dehumanization processes place groups outside the normative universe of moral protection, leaving them vulnerable to targeted genocidal victimization. These racialized and collectivized dehumanization processes thereby establish the contingent conditions for genocide.

We first use historical material to establish the ideological link in Darfur between the Sudanese state and the targeting of three black African groups – the Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit. We then analyze the historically unprecedented U.S. State Department Atrocities Documentation Survey [ADS] data on racial dehumanization and violence collected during the Darfur genocide. We use these data to document the combined role of Sudanese and Janjaweed forces in the incitement of racial epithets to collectively dehumanize and victimize black African groups. Finally, we use narratives from the ADS interviews to document the organized leadership and integration of Janjaweed with Sudanese forces in perpetrating genocide. We present this crucial interstitial link last to underline the importance of social efficacy and agency in genocide.

### **Racial Dehumanization and Denial**

Dehumanization is a mechanism that imposes degrading attributes on individuals and also entire groups for purposes of massive group destruction, the defining feature of genocide.<sup>4</sup> This process strips black Darfurians of their individuality and membership in Sudanese society, justifying attacks and denying them moral or normative protection (Alvarez 1997:146; see also Fein 1979; Hilberg 1985; Kelman and Hamilton 1989; Browning 1992). Racial and ethnic epithets conveying contempt and denying humanity

to targeted group members are effective instruments of dehumanization that make it easier for ordinary people to permit and participate in genocide (Dower 1986).

Given what we know sociologically about the pervasiveness of racial/ethnic antagonism in genocide historically, it is surprising to encounter frequent denials of the role of race in Darfur. The U.N. International Commission of Inquiry (2005) concluded that victims of violence in Darfur were not *objectively distinct* from their attackers and recognizable as *protected ethnic or racial groups* under the Genocide Conventions:

The various tribes that have been the objects of attacks and killings (chiefly the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa tribes) do not appear to make up ethnic groups distinct from the ethnic group to which persons or militias that attack them belong. They speak the same language (Arabic) and embrace the same religion (Muslim). In addition, also due to the measure of intermarriage, they can hardly be distinguished in their outward physical appearance from the members of tribes that allegedly attacked them (129).

Although this U.N. Commission conceded that victims of violence in Darfur might *subjectively identify themselves* as racially distinct, it did not find evidence that the attackers intended to destroy victim groups protected on this basis in international law. The Commission urged the U.N. to refer the Darfur case to the International Criminal Court [ICC] for investigation as a crime against humanity rather than genocide. The Commission did not further investigate the role of race as a socially constructed and contingent element in the Darfur genocide.<sup>5</sup>

This denial of race responded to two non-scientific concerns. First, that applying “African” and “Arab” racial categories might have deleterious repercussions: “setting in motion the complete dismemberment of Darfurian society ....” (de Waal 2007:3). Second, that acknowledging race might lead to an unsuccessful genocide prosecution (Power 2004:11). A simpler crime against humanity prosecution requires proof of widespread and systematic violence against civilians rather than evidence of intent to destroy racial or other protected groups.

In 2007, the International Criminal Court followed the U.N. Commission’s recommendation with charges of crimes against humanity rather than genocide against a Sudanese deputy minister, Ahmed Harun, and a Janjaweed militia leader, Ali Korship. The more than 100 page legal brief (Office of the Prosecutor 2007) contained several references to race but sidestepped claims – for example, by the U.S. State Department, the Save Darfur coalition, the scholar-activist Eric Reeves, and *New York Times* columnist Nicholas Kristof – of racially targeted Darfur atrocities.

The Court’s decision follows from the above concern about legally demonstrating an *intent* that is *beyond a reasonable doubt* and linked to targeting of *protected groups*. Sutherland (1940; 1945; 1949) confronted similar challenges in introducing the concept of white collar crime. He insisted on a probabilistic approach for social science purposes, which corresponds more closely to civil than criminal law standards. As we do for genocide, Sutherland emphasized the *collective* aspect of white collar crime and the need to understand how business groups developed “differential definitions” that collectively framed their intentions and behaviors as acceptable to both law enforcers and themselves.

Political entrepreneurs use ideology to collectively frame and mobilize groups. In particular, explaining mass atrocities in Darfur requires recognition of the socially constructed and dehumanizing process of collective *racial* framing. We demonstrate that an Arabization ideology, the social construction of racial categories, and an organized process of racial dehumanization using racial epithets were catalysts of a shift from a prior “normal” to a “crisis” frame (Obserschall 2000) for genocidal attacks. The U.N. Commission did not consider that racial divisions – both real and imagined – are often socially constructed in the period leading to a genocidal conflict.

Racial epithets are important for both legal and sociological analysis because they capture the motivation and intent of attackers. The frequently cited *Akayesu* decision in Rwanda (United Nations 1998) and the *Jelisi* decision in Bosnia (United Nations 1999) both emphasize the importance of spoken language as evidence of genocide. Our emphasis is on the further sociological importance of spoken language in genocide.

The words and phrases used by perpetrators to dehumanize victims play similar roles in genocide and hate crimes (Jeness 1997; Green et al. 2001; Horowitz 2001). In both, dehumanizing language diminishes moral and practical constraints on participants as well as bystanders, and this is an intrinsically important collective action process. We hypothesize that an essential element in the explanation of the severity of the Darfur genocide is the dehumanizing impact of the collectivized motivation and intent expressed in the racial epithets shouted by Janjaweed militia and Sudanese military while attacking black African groups. Thus our goal is to better understand how the racialization of this collective dehumanization process influences the contexts and severity of genocide.

Using a Darfur refugee survey introduced below, we empirically illuminate top down macro-level and bottom up micro-level mechanisms underlying severe forms of genocidal victimization. The top down collective framing in Darfur involved a government led Arab supremacist ideology that devalued black Africans. This ideology began a process that demeaned and ultimately excluded black African groups from a protected universe of moral humanitarian obligation, leaving them vulnerable to victimization. The bottom up collective framing was activated by the aggregation and concentration of racial epithets that not only degraded but fundamentally dehumanized black African groups, leading to frenzied attacks by combined Sudanese government forces and Janjaweed militias on targeted black African villages. Our critical collective framing perspective identifies this succession of “macro-micro-macro” mechanisms that drove state led genocide in Darfur.

### **A Critical Collective Framing Model of Genocide**

Our critical collective framing approach posits the Sudanese genocidal state as an endogenous system that emerged as the transformed macro-level result of collective action. This approach both diverges and converges with six past explanatory approaches.

Our attention to racial symbols and identification diverges from a state insecurity approach which focuses on justifiable reactions to insurgent threats (e.g., Posen 1993). We demonstrate that threats of rebel or insurgent groups are wrongly perceived and exaggerated in Darfur. Our approach similarly diverges from a second primordial explanation that emphasizes hatreds so long standing they are considered exogenous

(e.g., Kaplan 1993). While we acknowledge past hostilities, we emphasize that their influences are contingent on time and place.

A third contextual consideration is the competition for life-sustaining resources in the population-resource perspective (Diamond 2005; Tubiana 2007). This perspective sees settlement density not simply as concentrations of people but also the presence of desirable property - possessions, livestock and the settled land itself. Densely settled areas are where opportunities and incentives are greatest and resources most strained by those who want and need them. The influence of population and resources is also contingent and furthermore mediated by racial dehumanization.

Among the most important contingencies we consider are choices highlighted in a fourth instrumental perspective featuring state based ethno-political entrepreneurs who advance their interests by cultivating public fear and disrespect of subordinate groups (e.g., Hardin 1995; Valentino 2004). These feelings are often stimulated with invidious socially constructed racial attributions. Thus our approach further overlaps with a fifth constructionist approach that emphasizes racial symbols and identity manipulation by elites (e.g., Kaufman 2001). We draw finally from a sixth cognitive framing approach which identifies shifts noted above from “normal” to “crisis” scripts or frames during emerging conflicts (Obershall 2000)

Our synthesis is a critical collective framing perspective built on the scaffold of Coleman’s (1986) social action theory, displayed in Figure 1, while drawing also on Sampson (2006) and Matsueda’s (2007) concepts of collective and social efficacy. Sampson (2006:55) reintroduces Coleman’s theory of social action in a discussion of the “transformation problem”: the problem of how systems- in our case, genocidal state

systems- emerge from the interdependent and purposive actions of individuals. Coleman (1986:1321) writes that this transformation “is the process through which individual preferences become collective choices; the process through which dissatisfaction becomes revolution; through which simultaneous fear in members of a crowd turns into mass panic ....” Coleman’s emphasis is on the dynamics of collective transformation.

Further following Matsueda (2007), we focus on the social efficacy of local government and militia leaders as ethnic entrepreneurs of racial dehumanization and collective transformation leading to organized genocidal victimization of specific groups. Coleman’s work underlines the need to understand the social and collective efficacy of what he calls “type 3” relations that transform micro-level social action into macro-level systems. We assess the collective motivations and intentions involved in the type 3 relations with quantitative survey data from the Atrocities Documentation Survey [ADS] introduced below. But first we discuss the type 1 link as the foundation for Coleman’s type 3 linked relations and our critical collective framing approach. We discuss the crucial link 2 role of local leaders last, to emphasize the importance of social efficacy in our model.

[Figure 1 About Here]

### **Link 1: State-Led Ethno-Political Entrepreneurship using Ideological Crisis Frames**

An Arab-Islamic supremacist ideology gained a strong foothold in Darfur’s politics in the mid-1980s. Link 1 in Figure 1 depicts this entrepreneurial and state supported, macro-level role of ideology. We conceptualize this ideology within the

framework of political process theory (McAdam 1982; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996) and as the foundation for a genocidal political opportunity structure in Darfur.

Thus the leadership of the Sudanese government used a transformational crisis framing (Benford and Snow 2000; Oberschall 2000) to reconfigure the political demography of Darfur (Jok 2007). More specifically, Arab-Islamic supremacist ideology served as an instrument of domination that demeaned black African groups. Although Darfur is nearly entirely Muslim, the state-led ideology distinguished between Arabs and black Africans and took the side of Arabs in disputes about land in Darfur.

Comparative analyses reveal the broader global importance of changing ethno-political ideologies and state level entrepreneurship in framing Link 1 of genocidal processes. For example, Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson (2006) indicate that ethnic intolerance was not initially salient in the 1990s conflict in the former Yugoslavia, but rather became so after the war began. The shift was orchestrated by the Milosevic government's elite manipulation of public images and events (797). Incorporating constructionist themes, Oberschall (2000) indicates that cognitively framed "normal" attitudes in post-Tito Yugoslavia gave way as they were overwhelmed by an elite Milosevic instigated "crisis framing."<sup>6</sup>

In South Africa, John and Jean Comaroff (1997:406) similarly note that an elite driven crisis atmosphere of group conflict provoked distancing and separation between blacks and whites, and that at such crisis moments "cleavages, real and imaginary, reassert themselves" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997:406). Brubaker (1996) calls this a process of "unmixing,"<sup>7</sup> which aptly describes Rwanda. Even though the Hutu and Tusti often intermarried and frequently were indistinguishable, the Rwandan government led a

propaganda campaign with a crisis frame and forced the use of identity cards (Prunier 1997). This advanced a process of racially marking the Tutsi for genocide.

In Darfur, national ethno-political entrepreneurs also provoked deadly racial distinctions through an ideological shift from normal to crisis frames (Deng 1995). The 1970s included more normal periods of relative optimism about a Sudanese identity joining Arab and African groups (Doornbos 1988). It was common to then assert that, “Dar Fur was an African kingdom that embraced Arabs as equals” (Flint and de Waal 2005:3). But Burton (1991:514) finds that a history of slavery “left deeply engrained animosities.” Appiah (2007:17) identifies the salience of the slavery trope, noting that “because people almost always think of slaves as belonging to a kind – a race, a tribe, a class, a family – that is suited to enslavement, the slave status tends to survive the abandonment of the formal institutions of slavery.” Slavery reemerged as a background theme signaling a racial redefinition that was moving from demeaning to degrading.

Thus the 1980s “Arabization” policy of “Arab-Islamic imperialism” aroused the latent hostilities of a crisis frame with its evolving supremacist ideology and its assault on traditional African cultures (El-Battahan 2006). This assault included a rejection of the independent status of women, tribal dancing, alcohol consumption, bartering practices, and traditional modes of dress. These were replaced with the teaching and speaking of Arabic, restrictions on women, rejection of alcohol, a cash economy, and Arab traditions of dress, including the *jellabiya* for men and the *taub* for women (Flint and de Waal 2005:14-15). The process was demeaning to the traditions of black African groups.

There were at least two added macro-level and highly politicized sources and phases to this Arabized crisis framing in Darfur. One source involved the Libyan

strongman, Muammar Qaddafi, who during the famine of 1985 brought guns into Darfur to create an “Arab belt” and to support an “Arab Gathering” across sub-Saharan Africa. A second source involved the 1986 campaign electing Sadiq al-Mahadi as Prime Minister of Sudan to create an “Arab and Islamic Union” (Harir 1994). The Union explicitly sought to subordinate black Africans to Arab Muslim rule.

As part of this subordination process, Arab intellectuals wrote Sudanese Prime Minister al-Mahadi a widely publicized letter in 1987 celebrating the “Arab race” for the “creation of civilization in the region” and demanding greater government control and representation (Rabbah 1988). From this period on, Arabs replaced Africans in the civil service of Darfur (International Crisis Group 2004:11).

The 1993 military coup that installed current President al-Bashir backed these policies with belligerence and brutality. Earlier demeaning policies were now imposed with a more open and degrading use of force. The crisis frame intensified in response to the Justice and Equality Movement’s [JEM] publication in 2000 of *The Black Book*, documenting Arab dominance in Sudan’s government. When the allied Sudan Liberation Army [SLA] subsequently launched several attacks against government forces in Darfur in early 2003 (Flint and de Waal 2005), the Sudanese state responded with a heightened crisis sense of insecurity about the threat of racial insurgency.

El-Battahani (2006:38) writes that “the rulers in Khartoum have mastered a technique of divide and rule, of disrupting and co-opting ethnic, regional elites.” More broadly, he concludes that, “of all ideological weapons used in African warfare; ... ethnicity ... has proved by far the superior ....” (35). The Sudanese government used Arab militias for nearly twenty years in the south, sometimes even supplementing them

with black African recruits from Darfur. In 2003, the latter recruitment ended and Bashir shifted the militias to attacks on the settled black African agricultural groups in Darfur.

The government took advantage of rising racial tensions between Darfur's settled African agriculturalists and landless nomadic Arab pastoralists who were growing increasingly desperate for access to water and pastures for their livestock in an ecosystem of advancing desertification (Suliman 2000; Harir 1992).<sup>8</sup> As further discussed below, an experienced deputy minister, Ahmed Harun, was assigned responsibility for recruiting and equipping the Janjaweed militias in Darfur. We present quantitative evidence below of the joint Sudanese government and Janjaweed militia role, represented in Link 1 of Figure 1, with an analysis of the ADS data. As noted, we document and discuss the interstitial Link 2 organizational role of local leadership in the penultimate section.

### **Links 3a & 3b: Aggregation and Concentration of Collective Dehumanization**

The ultimately crucial steps in the dehumanizing collective framing process are links 3a and 3b in Figure 1. Hinton (2002:36) suggests the term “genocidal priming” to refer to the transformative dynamics represented by these links, and we further incorporate Hinton's (37) point that “when the priming is ‘hot’ and genocide takes place, there is almost always some sort of ‘genocidal activation’ that ignites the charge ....”

*Our thesis is that this kind of racial spark or ignition is observed in the aggregation and concentration of the collectively framed racial epithets shouted during attacks in Darfur. It is this aggregation and concentration of racial dehumanization that ignites the collective effect that Hinton calls genocidal activation.*

Our framing perspective further draws from work on ethnic conflict and domestic violence. Brubaker and Laitin (1998:427) call for such cross level and sub-field linkage when they suggest that “we may have as much to learn about the sources and dynamics of ethnic violence from the literature on criminology (Katz 1998) as from the literature on ethnicity or ethnic conflict.” This reference invokes Katz’ (1988) account of the role of cursing in “righteous slaughters” of intimates and acquaintances.

Consider cursing. Most of the studies of impassioned violence reveal a great deal of attendant cursing. Although impassioned attacks sometimes occur without verbal forewarning, it seems natural to move into assaults with shouts of ‘bitch,’ ‘you fucking asshole,’ ‘rat bastard,’ ‘punk mother-fucker,’ ‘nickel-and-dime drunk,’ .... Why? .... They curse, not in the superficial sense ..., but ... to effect degrading transformations .... Symbolically transforming the offending party into an ontologically lower status .... Curses draw on the communal language and its primordial sensibility about the relationship between the sacred and the profane .... Cursing sets up violence to be a sacrifice to honor the attacker as a priest representing the collective moral being (1988:36-7).

The challenge is to generalize from this transformational role of curses in the specific ontology of interpersonal crimes to collective racialized domains of genocidal violence.

This is where group identity again becomes salient. It is the “us” versus “them” intensification of group conflict that raises “righteous slaughters” to mass atrocities. Katz (1988) argues that disabling the moral inhibition against murdering a “loved one” is accomplished by person specific cursing, while mass murder raises the stakes from

individual denouncement to group dehumanization. This higher order transformation in Darfur involved a collectivized process of racial dehumanization.

Thus “such extreme dehumanization becomes possible,” Kelman and Hamilton (1989:19) observe, “when the target group can be readily identified as ... a distinct racial, religious, ethnic, or political group regarded as inferior or sinister.” They explain that this is how killing can feed upon itself and become genocidal, with perpetrators “coming to believe that the victims are subhuman and deserve to be rooted out” (20). Fein (1979; 2007) and Gamson (1995) explicitly link this racial dehumanization to genocide. Gamson writes that “the cultural contest is over who is the ‘we,’ to whom specific moral obligations apply, and who is the ‘they,’ to whom they do not” (3). This framing contest maps out what Fein (1979) envisions as the “universe of obligation.”

We argue that the racial epithets heard during attacks in Darfur are transformed into collective motive and intent as they are aggregated and concentrated in selected settlements and begin to take on a frenzied dimension in Link 3a. Coleman argues that this kind of transformative (i.e., type 3) process is weakly developed in other sociological theories. The importance of this process is reflected further in the Link 3b, which depicts the collective frenzy that connects hostile racial motivation and intent to genocidal violence. This lethal victimization is the lasting scar of the genocidal state.

The collective frenzy represented in Link 3b is the culmination of racial dehumanization. Ground attacks on African villages were undertaken by forces shouting racial epithets. These epithets in Darfur involve tropes of slavery and sub-humanity:

\* “They called her Nuba [a derogatory term for black Africans] dog, son of dogs, and we came to kill you and your kids.”

- \* “You donkey, you slave, we must get rid of you.”
- \* “You blacks are not human. We can do anything we want to you. You cannot live here.”
- \* “We kill our cows when they have black calves – we will kill you too.”
- \* “All the people in the village are slaves, you make this area dirty, we are here to clean the area.”
- \* “You blacks are like monkeys. You are not human.”
- \* “Black prostitute, whore, you are dirty – black.”
- \* “We will kill any slaves we find and cut off their heads.”

These words and phrases shouted by the perpetrators are explicit evidence of dehumanizing motivations and intentions during attacks on black African villagers.

*The racial component of the epithets is the motivational element. The intentional element includes the targeted references to killing, raping, assaulting, looting, and destroying group life. We shorten this reference to “collective racial intent” in tables and figures below. The further critical dimension, of course, is that when targeted by state based ethnic entrepreneurs, such expressions of violent racism further acquire an aggregated and concentrated force that rises above its individual expression and that leads to collective genocidal victimization. Prunier (2005:165) concludes that “since Darfur had been in a state of protracted racial civil war since the mid-1980s, the tools were readily available; they merely needed to be upgraded. It was done and the rest is now history.” We demonstrate below how the aggregation and concentration of racial epithets significantly increased the severity of genocidal victimization in Darfur.*

## **The Atrocities Documentation Survey [ADS]**

Explanations of genocide are mostly presented in comparative historical case studies (e.g., Midlarsky 2005) rather than quantitative analyses (but see Gurr and Harff 1994). Our goals are both integrative and quantitative. The critical integrative aspect of our approach involves empirically connecting state led ethnic entrepreneurship with cognitive framing and genocidal violence.

In June of 2004, a U.S. official let Sudan know their activities in Darfur were under satellite observation (AAAS 2004), even though “the images are not hard evidence until ... corroborated by testimony of witnesses on the ground.” During the summer of 2004, aides convinced Secretary of State Collin Powell to substantiate charges of genocide with survey evidence. The State Department authorized the ADS interviews of 1136 Darfur refugees in Chad.<sup>9</sup> A brief summary of the survey with several tables and maps (U.S. Department of State 2004) formed the background for Powell’s September 2004 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the genocide in Darfur.

The ADS is based on a multi-stage cluster sample of 1136 Darfur refugees in 20 camps and settlements in eastern Chad (see Howard 2006). The UN organized its camps by lettered grids, with each sector led by a sheikh. The ADS team identified all sectors in the camps and sampled them proportionately by size and ethnicity. They then sampled “households” and adults within them randomly for interviews.

A result of organizing the camps and settlements around sheiks was that their social geography reflected the settlement clusters (hereafter “settlements”) from which refugees fled. With the State Department’s geo-spatial technology, cartographers, and translators, interviewers were able to locate 90 percent of the originating settlements.

We used the ADS field atlas to locate respondents in the 22 originating settlements on Map 1 with 15 or more respondents each and including 932 of the 1136 respondents. We calibrated the circles on the map in quartiles of persons who reported hearing racial epithets. The sample was designed to proportionately represent the population of refugees from adjoining areas of Darfur. An evaluation for the State Department indicated the sample “captured the entire scope of the Darfuri refugees in Chad.”<sup>10</sup>

[Map 1 About Here]

The ADS data uniquely and extensively measured victimization during attacks. We know of only one other systematic study of pre-camp violence in Darfur (see Depoortere et. al 2004), and none which includes sexual violence. The refugees were asked- since the beginning of the conflict about 18 months earlier- when, how, and why they had left Darfur and if, when, and how they, their family, or fellow villagers were harmed. The survey mixed the closed-ended format of health surveys with the semi-structured format of legal witness statements (Respini-Irwin 2005). We cross-checked and supplemented the ADS data by reading and coding the extensive narratives recorded in the interviews (see also Hagan, Rymond-Richmond, and Parker 2005).

The data include the age, gender, and group memberships of the displaced individuals, the separate and combined government and Janjaweed militia attacking groups, the forms of attacks, their particular reported targets, the density of settlement clusters, measures of rebel activity (which were supplemented with a media study measure), and reports of hearing the racial epithets described above. We describe the dependent measure of severity of victimization next. Descriptive details for the independent variables are presented in Table 1 and in the Appendix.

[Table 1 About Here]

Our measurement of severity of victimization used a section of each survey that recorded up to 20 incidents of victimization. Respondents reported attacks on themselves, their families, and settlements involving bombing, killing, rape, abduction, assault, property destruction, and theft leading to displacement. Each respondent therefore reported for him or herself together with his or her settlement.

The victimization severity score is based on the common law seriousness (see Hindelang 1978) of the incidents reported. We aggregated the incidents experienced or witnessed by each respondent in the settlement. We assigned values of five to reported killings, four to sexual violence or abductions, three to assaults, two to property destruction or theft, and one to displacement.<sup>11</sup> We also briefly summarize below more specific results based on numbers of reported killings and rapes,<sup>12</sup> however, the measurement properties are more attractive for the severity scale than for the numerical count scales. This is probably because of the limited opportunities for respondents to actually count or even estimate these numbers. Chirot and McCauley (2006:17-18) observe that it is self-defeating to try to define mass murder in a precise numerical way. It is also impossible to gauge the exact amount and value of property theft and destruction. Meanwhile, the severity scale is nearly normal in its distribution, while the frequency counts are predictably skewed with many zeros. The victimization severity scores ranged from 20 to 56, with an average score of just over 34.<sup>13</sup> As noted further below, the severity scale performs well in terms of reliability.

## Hierarchical Linear Models of Genocide Victimization in Darfur

We use hierarchical linear models [HLM] (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) to estimate variation in outcomes within and between settlements, with adjustments for non-independence resulting from clustering within settlements. For example, our final within settlement model of severity of victimization regresses individual level reports of victimization severity by the 932 respondents on their individual reports of hearing racial epithets and other independent variables. Our between settlement model regresses the average victimization severity scores for the 22 settlements – after the individual level variables are taken into account – on the proportion of the respondents who report they have heard racial epithets and other variables in each of the settlements.

We learn from the resulting joint analysis not only about individual level sources of variation in victimization in Darfur, but also about the influence of differences in the aggregation and concentration of racial epithets between settlements on victimization, with the individual level variables controlled. It is in this sense that we regard the aggregation and concentration of racial epithets in this analysis as a collective measure [Link 3b, Figure 1] of the influence of racial motivation and intent on victimization.<sup>14</sup>

The within-settlement model of victimization severity as our ultimate outcome is:

$$\text{Victimization Severity}_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \sum_{q=1}^{18} \beta_q X_{qij} + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where  $\beta_{0j}$  is the intercept;  $X_{qij}$  is the value of covariate  $q$  associated with respondent  $i$  in settlement-level  $j$ ; and  $\beta_q$  are the partial effects of the respondent's age, gender, rebels in town, missing rebel data, attacking Janjaweed, Sudanese, or combined Sudanese and Janjaweed forces, victimized Zaghawa, Fur, Masalit, or Jebel groups, bombing, targeting of women, attacks during the first or second displacement peaks, and hearing racial

epithets on severity of victimization. The error term,  $\varepsilon_{ij}$ , is the unique contribution of each individual, which is assumed to be independently and normally distributed with constant variance  $\sigma^2$ .

The between-settlement equation is:

$$\beta_{0j} = \theta_{00} + \theta_{01} (\text{collective racial intent}) + \dots + U_{0j},$$

where  $\theta_{00}$  is the overall average standardized victimization severity score, and  $\theta_{01}$  is the regression coefficient of the effect of racial epithets measured as a settlement level mean score on total victimization. Additional settlement-level covariates are incorporated as further controls and we include significant cross-level interactions. Because the individual-level covariates at level 1 are centered about the sample means,  $\beta_{0j}$  is the standardized mean total victimization in a settlement after covariates have been controlled.  $U_{0j}$  is the settlement-level error term, assumed to be normally distributed with a variance of  $\tau$

A preliminary concern is the reliability of the outcome measure of severity of victimization that results from partitioning of the variance within and between settlements. The settlement measure of differences in this outcome yields a .733 degree of reliability. The intraclass correlation is .23 and statistically significant, indicating about a quarter of the victimization severity scale's variance is between settlements, comparable to that found in analogous multi-level studies of organizations or schools.

### **Multi-Level Structural Models of Genocide Victimization**

We first consider several models of the mediating concept of racial motivation and intent that is at the center of our critical collective frame analysis. These

dehumanizing racial epithets represent the constructionist framing of the conflict in Darfur into “us” and “them” motivational terms. Chirot and McCauley (2006:73) remark that “hate seems to us best understood as an extreme form of negative identification.” This extreme negative identification is racially dehumanizing. Since our measure of racial motivation and intent is a binary report of whether the respondent heard shouted racial epithets during the attack that preceded flight to the refugee camp, we estimate the models with the logistic regression equations presented in Table 2.

The first of these equations reveals that these epithets are heard significantly more often when Sudanese and Janjaweed forces are combined in the attack. This suggests a primary instrumental role of Sudanese forces and is consistent with Chirot and McCauley’s (2006:8) proposition that “large scale genocides need the organizational power of government” – as anticipated by Link 1 and the role of the state in Figure 1. The first equation also reveals that rebels are less likely to be in the villages in which racial epithets are heard. This negative finding strongly suggests direct racial targeting of civilians rather than of suspected rebels that would be expected in a more legally justifiable self-defense, counter-insurgency strategy.<sup>15</sup> One survivor interviewed in the ADS survey noted the difference between the current conflict and past conflicts by asserting “Ten years ago there was fighting between Zaghawa and Arab. But this is a targeting of civilians, this is different. They want to commit genocide.”

[Table 2 About Here]

The second model in Table 2 introduces the African groups that are expected targets of the racial epithets in Link 2 of Figure 1, as well as the two peak periods of the attacks. Three of the four African groupings- the Fur, Masalit, and Jebel- are

significantly more likely to have heard the racial epithets- while only the Zaghawa are not. A separate analysis indicated that the Zaghawa are subjected to bombing more often than the other groups, while racial epithets are more likely to be heard in ground attacks. Meanwhile, controlling for the African group memberships in the second model reduces the effect of the combined Sudanese and Janjaweed attacks by about 20 percent, offering further evidence that these joined forces instrumentally directed their attacks with a socially constructed racial focus on these particular African groups. Finally, a significant negative effect of the first peak of attacks suggests racialization of the attacks increased over the conflict, which is consistent with the emergence of a crisis frame in Darfur.

The third model estimated in Table 2 adds both settlement-level and cross-level interactions to the analysis. There are neither significant main effects for settlement density nor rebel news (i.e., indicated by media reports). However, the bottom panel of Table 2 indicates that there is a significant cross-level interaction effect of settlement density with the combined involvement of Sudanese and Janjaweed forces on the hearing of racial epithets. This concentration of racial motivation and intent on densely populated areas is consistent with the population perspective on group competition for life-sustaining resources indicated at the origin of the model in Figure 1. The meaning of this cross-level interaction can be clarified with the graph presented in Figure 2 that averages estimates of combined Sudanese and Janjaweed attacks on racial epithets at the higher and lower quartile levels of settlement density.

[Figure 2 About Here]

Recall that we measured both of the interacting variables in Figure 2 in terms of variation from their sample means. The results indicate increased population density

makes racial epithets more likely when Sudanese and Janjaweed forces attack together. When the Sudanese or Janjaweed forces attack separately, increased population density diminishes the hearing of these epithets. The effect of the combination of forces in the higher quartiles of population density approximately doubles the hearing of racial epithets from about 20 to more than 40 percent. As anticipated by Links 1 and 2 of Figure 1, this is compelling evidence of the instrumental role of the Sudanese state in intensifying the expression of a socially constructed racial motivation and intent by joining with the Janjaweed in attacks on densely settled areas of Darfur.

Table 3 explores the socially constructed influence of racial motivation and intent- measured at the individual and settlement-level by racial epithets- in increasing the severity of genocidal victimization. The OLS regression equations estimated in this table take into account statistically the influence on the severity of victimization of individual-level correlates previously included in Table 2, as well as bombing. The first model estimated again supports predictions following from Link 1 in Figure 1. Thus this model reveals the instrumentally combined salience of Sudanese and Janjaweed forces, this time in predicting victimization severity. To a lesser degree, Sudanese forces acting alone also significantly increase this victimization, while Janjaweed forces acting alone do not significantly increase victimization severity. These results document the leading role of the Sudanese state in the genocidal violence. Meanwhile, rebels being in the settlement do not significantly increase victimization severity. The latter null finding undermines the self-defense, counter-insurgency justification for the attacks, and this finding is consistent with comments from respondents like the following: “My village

was not defended and how could we defend? There was no equality in power. There were no rebels nearby.”

The dummy variable representing the first two weeks of the survey when rebel questions were not asked (i.e., the missing rebel data variable) indicates this was apparently a period when less severe victimization was reported. This implies that asking these questions in the early weeks would not have resulted in the rebel variable being significant. Finally, the first model reveals that severity of adult victimization decreases with age, as is true more generally in crime research (see Hirschi & Gottfredson 1983).

[Table 3 About Here]

The second model introduces the specific African groups as socially constructed targets, as well as the targeting of women, bombing, the peak attack measures, and the measure of individual-level racial motivation and intent. Again, as predicted by Link 2 of Figure 1, the Fur, Masalit, and Jebal are at significantly higher risk of more severe victimization, while the Zaghawa are not. The Fur respondents report extreme dehumanizing experiences of torture in the open-ended survey narratives- people were cut, brains removed, sexual organs cut off, and skin removed (see also Human Rights Watch 2005). Women are also a specifically targeted group. Respondents report that the Janjaweed and Sudanese military troops specifically targeted the women by raping and abducting them. Like the racial epithets, the words or phrases spoken by the perpetrators during the attack provide insight into their motivation and intent. One respondent reports hearing the perpetrators say, “We will take your women and make them ours. We will change the race.” Another respondent was raped, branded, and told, “You are now Arab wives.” In these examples, the intention is to change the race of the offspring.

The effect of combined Sudanese and Janjaweed forces is reduced by about 15 percent in this equation, while the Sudanese force effect is essentially unchanged. This again suggests the instrumental role of the Sudanese in targeting and unleashing victimization when they attack in conjunction with the Janjaweed, as anticipated in Link 1 of Figure 1. The two peak attack variables are significant. Finally, the individual level racial epithet measure of racial motivation and intent has a strong and highly significant effect on victimization severity. This is as predicted in Link 3a of Figure 1.

The third model in Table 3 adds the mean settlement level racial epithet measure of collective racial motivation and intent, which as predicted in Link 3b, is statistically significant. The addition of only this variable in the third model has the further effect of reducing the size and eliminating the significance of the African Fur and Masalit group measures. Consistent with the focus of our critical collective framing perspective, this means that settlement level differences in collective racial motivation and intent account for the higher severity of victimization of the Fur and Masalit groups in Darfur. Further analysis at the settlement level can add clarity to this finding. To maintain the robustness of the significance tests, we remove the African group measures that are statistically insignificant with the inclusion of the racial motivation and intent variable in the model.

Models 4 and 5 in Table 3 bring settlement density into the victimization analysis. When settlement density is introduced alone at the settlement level, it is statistically significant. This indicates that severity of victimization increases in densely settled areas of Darfur where the population perspective argues the opportunities and incentives for attacks are greatest and resources are potentially the most strained. But recall also that we argued (i.e., as the sequence in Figure 1 indicates) that collective racial motivation

and intent is a crucial and socially constructed mediating mechanism through which settlement density would exercise its exogenous influence.

Our data uniquely reflect the respective exogenous and endogenous roles of population density and racial motivation and intent. When the main effect of collective racial motivation and intent is added alone or in cross-level combination with bombing, the effect of settlement density is reduced by about one third and becomes non-significant. The mediating effect of collective racial motivation and intent in removing the significance of the effect of settlement density on severity of victimization is striking evidence of the salience of race as the mediating – Link 3b – mechanism in this conflict.

The cross-level interaction of collective racial intent with bombing on victimization severity adds another dimension to these results. Because the bombing is entirely under Sudanese state control, and because we saw above that the instrumental joining of the Sudanese with the Janjaweed in the attacks drives the racial epithet measure of racial motivation and intent, this cross-level interaction further points to the instrumental role of the Sudanese state. The final model (6) estimated in Table 3 demonstrates that including both individual and settlement level measures of rebel activity in the villages does not account for these effects.

The cross-level interaction of Sudanese bombing with collective racial motivation and intent (measured with settlement level differences in racial epithets) is particularly striking evidence of the instrumental use of state power to divide and victimize the socially constructed identification of subordinate target groups. The impact of this cross-level interaction is further clarified with the graphical capacity of HLM in Figure 3.

As in Figure 2, we measure both of the interacting variables in Figure 3 in terms of variation from their sample means, now with these following results. At the lower quartiles of collective racial motivation and intent, the effect of increased bombing is associated with decreasing levels of victimization severity, while in the higher quartiles of collective racial intent the effect of increased bombing is to elevate the severity of victimization. We previously argued that the Sudanese government instrumentally directed the Janjaweed forces and channeled their socially constructed racial hostility toward African groups as a means of more effectively gaining control over the Darfur region- partly out of the insecurity and fear this region was escaping government control (see Flint and de Waal 2005). Figure 3 supplements Table 3 in showing how in densely settled areas the concentration of bombing and collective racial hostility against specific African groups, such as the Fur and Masalit, produces an elevated severity of genocidal victimization.<sup>16</sup> The fact that the government directed the bombing and enlisted the Janjaweed in racially animated attacks that intensified the severity of victimization indicates that the Sudanese state intentionally took a command role in the collective enactment and perpetration of genocide – as hypothesized with the combination of links identified in Figure 1.

[Figure 3 About Here]

## **Link 2: Locally Organized Ethno-Political Entrepreneurs of Racial Dehumanization**

We turn finally to the interstitial role of local leadership in our model, which we illustrate with further narratives from the ADS interviews below. As Mertonian strain theorists (e.g., Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Messner and Rosenfeld 1993) emphasize, and as

anticipated in the discussion of political process theory above, the integration of legitimate (e.g., government authorized) with illegitimate (e.g., gang and militia organized) opportunity structures can activate and advance collective action, organized criminality, and even genocidal victimization. In genocides, state entrepreneurs often recruit local agents who possess the social efficacy (Matsueda 2007) needed to transform individual initiative into collective action. Authorities activation of ethnic attacks by from “above” requires locally led “resonance from below” (Mamdani 2001:7).

By further incorporating Matsueda’s (2007) collective action approach, we address the classic question of how authorities enlisted civilians in locally organized and targeted mass atrocities. Official and unofficial community leaders in Darfur, such as Musa Hilal, effectively organized Arab civilians into “war according to the crisis script.” In this kind of “us” and “them” script, “once the young man ‘took out a gun’ he became encapsulated in a quasi military unit subject to peer solidarity and ethnic loyalty” (Oberschall 2000:997-8; also Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004:14).

In Darfur, authorities integrated local outlaw Janjaweed militia with the reservist Public Defense Forces of the Armed Forces and the Police (Office of the Prosecutor 2007:40). Locally organized indoctrination included instruction in “us” and “them” distinctions that escalated from demeaning and degrading to dehumanizing characterizations. These included attributions of subordinate, slave, and sub-human statuses. Racial epithets constituted the hooks for the dehumanization leading to genocide. The incentive was clear, for as Dower (1986:89) brutally explains and our analysis starkly confirms: “It is ... easier to kill animals than fellow humans.”

Narrative descriptions of attacks recorded in the ADS interviews and information from the legal brief of the Office of the Prosecutor (2007) specifically demonstrate how the racial framing of the political opportunity structure in the Darfur genocide was locally mobilized. The first of two major government offensives began in mid-2003 when the locally infamous Arab leader, Musa Hilal, was released from prison to organize militias. Hilal and other militia leaders – such as Hamid Dawai, Ali Korship, and Abdullah Shineibat – were frequently identified by eyewitnesses in the ADS interviews.

Arab nomadic groups until recently traversed a changing landscape of diminished life chances. Almost overnight, socially efficacious (Matsueda 2007) local sheiks such as Hilal, Dawai, Korship, and Shineibat were newly empowered by the Sudanese state as leaders of Janjaweed militias; they became personal embodiments of the kind of mobility that can follow from the integration of legitimate and illegitimate opportunity structures in a genocidal setting.

These militia leaders organized attacks in which racial epithets were the collectively framed vocabulary of motive and intent. The approximate areas of their operations are shown on Map 2. These are also the areas with high reports of racial epithets and attacks, as we saw in Map 1 and in the quantitative analyses above.

[Map 2 About]

The ICC Office of the Prosecutor (2007) identified Ahmed Harun, then a Deputy Minister in charge of the “Darfur Security Desk,” as the official responsible for mobilizing local Janjaweed militia leaders like Hilal. Harun previously mobilized tribes in the 1990s in the Kordofan area to the east of Darfur. Beginning in 2003, he mobilized Janjaweed militias in Darfur.

Hilal, with Harun's support, rallied attacks on black African villages with a collective vocabulary of dehumanizing motivation and intent that was racially framed.<sup>17</sup> More specifically, an eyewitness from the ADS survey reported in June 2003 seeing Hilal speak to a mixed crowd of Arabs and black Africans in a market town near a militia training camp. He arrived in a four-wheel drive car with tinted windows and a mounted machine gun. An interviewer summarized the eyewitness account.

Musa Hilal said he was sent by the Government of Sudan, and he told the people that we are going to kill all the blacks in this area, and that if you kill people, nobody will be prosecuted. Also if you burn [i.e., homes], nobody will prosecute or 'question' you. Animals you find are yours. ... He said he will clear the land. Hilal was accompanied by a man who appeared to be a government official and who explained Hilal's recent arrest and return to North Darfur.

He wasn't from the area. He said Musa Hilal had been arrested, 'but we brought him back for your safety.' He instructed the people to 'understand' what Musa Hilal said, 'to obey his orders,' and to use him as a 'reference.' This eyewitness provided accounts of subsequent attacks and burnings.

Another ADS respondent was certain of Hilal's identity from primary school. This respondent recalled standing in the middle of the market when Hilal arrived with armed men. He announced that "the government gave me the order and I came here. The government gave me cars and uniforms. The government gave me the order to start killing the people here – all the blacks from here to Karnoi and Tine and up" (see Maps 1 and 2). Hilal indicated that he was told to "kill all the blacks in the area" and that his forces should "give the Arab people freedom" by "clear[ing] the land."

Two additional ADS respondents described Hilal's training camp. The first located the camp near Masteria and the second described in racially explicit terms the threat posed by the camp. The interviewer summarized her story:

She lived in Girgo village, one half hour walk from the Arab village of Midop, where Musa Hilal trained his men. They trained there for 25 days with weapons .... During the training, the Arabs shopped at the market in the black villages and they said they were going to kill all the blacks .... On the 26<sup>th</sup> day of the training, someone spoke over the microphone. He said that you have trained for 25 days and now you should kill the people in the nine villages nearby .... While she was fleeing, she was chased and caught by men .... The women were raped.

The interviewer reported the respondent was obviously traumatized.

The Office of the Prosecutor's (2007:60-61) presentation of evidence for charges against Harun and Korship (named above) documents a July 2003 speech Harun gave in Darfur with Hilal, implying protection for attacks on racially targeted African villagers:

On that day, Harun's speech was preceded by that of the notorious militia/Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal. Hilal's speech was characterized by the witnesses who heard it as 'very racist' .... Hilal's remarks were followed by Harun's announcement that the President had handed him the Darfur Security Desk and that he had the power and authority to kill and forgive ... in Darfur.

Harun himself indicated that he spent more than four months in Darfur (2007:53).

Harun was present at a meeting near Nyla when a militia/Janjaweed leader boasted that the Arab tribes "can wipe out the areas of the Fur, Zaghawa and Maslit in a matter of one month." Harun was heavily involved in the distribution of weapons and

money and the development of training camps. He reportedly had an “unlimited and unaudited” budget, and he repeatedly said in speeches that he held the power “to kill or forgive whoever” in Darfur (2007:53-70).

Harun encouraged attacks on *civilian* populations he associated with rebels, and he said they were ready “to kill three quarters of Darfur in order to allow one quarter to live.” His defense of the indiscriminate policy was that the “rebels infiltrate the villages” and thus that the villages “are like water to fish.” Harun encouraged taking from “all the Fur and what they had,” which he characterized as “booty,” and further identified the primary targets of attacks as the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit (2007:53-60).

### **Collective Dehumanization in Criminally Organized Action**

In sum, dehumanizing expressions of racial motivation and intent in the form of racial epithets most commonly occur during the joined attacks of Sudanese government with Arab Janjaweed forces on African Fur, Masalit and Jebel groups in Darfur. These racial expressions play an elevated role in areas densely settled by African groups, and individual and collective expressions of racial motivation and intent increase the severity of genocidal victimization. These findings and further evidence that Sudanese bombing associated with shouting of racial epithets increases the severity of genocide victimization support the claim that the Arab supremacist ideology of the Sudanese state is an important source of the dehumanization process that leads to genocide in Darfur.

We find no evidence that a presence of rebel groups is associated with severity of victimization, while there is significant evidence that the victimization of African groups by the Sudanese state is militarily unjustified as counter insurgency against rebel attacks.

Such findings question primordial and counter-insurgency explanations, while supporting aspects of the instrumental, population-resource, constructionist and cognitive perspectives that form the foundation of a critical collective framing account of genocidal victimization.

There is especially strong evidence that racial motivation and intent, expressed with racial epithets during attacks, form a consequential crisis frame in Darfur. *This dehumanization process placed black African groups in Darfur outside a bounded universe of moral obligation and left them vulnerable to targeted genocidal victimization.* Treatment of groups as dehumanized and contemptible makes them vulnerable and in this sense available for displacement and destruction. We found compelling evidence that collective processes of racial motivation and intent influence the severity of victimization across settlements, above and beyond this influence at the individual level, and that this collective frame mediates the concentration of attacks on densely settled areas and particular African groups. This evidence documents the kinds of organized social processes increasingly emphasized in international criminal law and is relevant to a social scientific determination that genocide has occurred in Darfur.

Specifically, the above findings are consistent with a sociological theory of what international law recognizes as “criminal organization,” “common purpose,” and “joint criminal enterprise.” International criminal prosecutions are saturated with assumptions about collective action (Meierhenrich 2006). A notable example is the recently aborted prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic [due to his death] for his involvement in a “joint criminal enterprise” to commit genocide in the former Yugoslavia (Hagan 2003).

A prominent legal scholar has emphasized the need to better understand the “kind of influence ... participants in such criminality actually exercise over one another, through what organizational devices and interactional dynamics” (Osiel 2005:1768). Our analysis of the emergence of collective racial motivation and intent provides direct evidence of the “interactional dynamics” involved in Darfur. The further sociological backdrop to this state organized criminal enterprise is the integration of legitimate government military and illegitimate paramilitary opportunity structures. These structures were built around Arab Janjaweed militias in Darfur by leadership figures partially identified in Map 2. In the interests of maintaining its control over Darfur, the Sudanese government integrated the Janjaweed into its military strategy.

The key to this integration is that the enlisted and newly empowered Arab Janjaweed forces are members of landless nomadic groups that are in increasing need of arable land. This is the population-resource based ecological context of a collective action and opportunity structure which uses an “us” and “them” crisis framing of collective racial motivation and intent to direct the unfolding of genocidal victimization in Darfur. Our findings indicate that racism is used in Darfur as an instrument for the collective framing of organized terror that amplifies the severity of genocidal victimization. In Coleman’s terms, this socially organized and instigated terror is a transformative “type 3” process with the features of a killing frenzy, or fanatical fury, which links targeted racial motivation and intent to genocidal violence.

There are, of course, limitations to the data analyzed in this paper. The data consist of surviving refugees whose former settlements were close enough to the Chad border to allow their escape. Yet in the Appendix there is notable evidence these data are

representative. Attacks are also reported retrospectively and it would be preferable to have separate sources for the measures of racial epithets and victimization. Nonetheless, legally trained interviewers made special efforts to document the racial epithets in precisely reported phrases, while the violence and victimization were specifically recorded in the ways police investigators take statements for later use in court. A follow-up effort was also made to obtain further corroboration for our findings.

The follow-up consisted of interviews by the first author during three weeks and more than 100 hours of fieldwork in October 2006 with the Darfur Investigation Team at the new International Criminal Court in The Hague. During a particularly instructive interview, the African Head of the Investigation Team received a cell phone call from an investigator the first author had interviewed the previous day in The Hague and who now was interviewing a Janjaweed defector in London. Within weeks, the BBC released a parallel interview with an anonymous Janjaweed defector. Either the two interviews were with the same defector or they corroborated one another's accounts. The interview<sup>18</sup> described much that is statistically documented in our data analysis, for example, that Janjaweed fighters were instructed with racial epithets and orders such as "kill the blacks," that the Janjaweed did not fight without Sudanese orders, that Sudanese bombing characteristically preceded Janjaweed ground attacks, that abductions and rapes were common, and that civilians more than rebels were the intended targets of the attacks. This interview also includes an important assertion of repeated visits to the training camps by a Sudanese Minister of the Interior.

Such evidence about the conflict in Darfur might make its prosecution as genocide seem certain. From 200,000 to 400,000 or more have died (Hagan and Palloni

2006; Hagan, Rymond-Richmond and Parker 2005), and from two to three million have been forcibly displaced. Yet neither the E.U., which is the main funding source for the new International Criminal Court [ICC], nor the U.N. Commission of Inquiry in Darfur (2005) which recommended referral of the Darfur case to the ICC, nor the recent brief filed by the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (2007) called this conflict genocide. They instead characterize Darfur as a lesser crime against humanity.

It is possible that racism is not only a significant force in genocidal victimization, but also present in the language and naming of ethnic conflicts. Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004:21) emphasize “collective denial” and “misrecognition” are prerequisites for genocide. Misrecognition is Bourdieu’s term for collective denials that are so deeply embedded in our socially induced unconsciousness that they become a matter or habit, or what Bourdieu called habitus (see Bourdieu 1977). We noted distinctive parallels between genocidal victimization in Europe and Africa. Yet perhaps with regret born of his own misrecognition as the U.N. Secretary-General of the genocide in Rwanda, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (2004) cogently observed that, “A genocide in Africa has not received the same attention that genocide in Europe or genocide in Turkey or genocide in other parts of the world. There is still this kind of basic discrimination against the African people and the African problems.” We suggest that the rejection of the role of race in Darfur, again led by the U.N. in its influential Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, is a form of misrecognition and denial by an institutionally embedded and culturally powerful voice using “techniques of neutralization” (Sykes and Matza 1957; Alvarez 1997).

Like the founding figure of genocide, Raphael Lemkin, Edwin Sutherland argued it was important to identify white collar crime as a crime, for the purposes of public discourse as well as scientific study. Sutherland understood the importance of applying probabilistic rather than criminal law reasoning to white collar crime and of incorporating a collective conceptualization for its explanation. Genocide demands the same understanding. Legal reasoning has obscured the recognition of genocidal victimization and allowed an underestimation of the role of the state in its collective racial framing. As noted at the outset, Fein (1990:7) believes sociologists are inhibited by a lack of boldness on this topic. More than fifty years after Sutherland added white collar crime to the agenda of public sociology, it is time to do the same with Lemkin's concept of genocide.






Figure 1. Transformation Model of Genocide: Macro-Micro-Macro Mechanisms

Darfur Refugees in Chad, Summer, 2004.



Map 2. Janjaweed Militia Leaders' Areas of Operation



**Table 1. Individual and Settlement Cluster Statistics: Atrocities Documentation Survey, Darfur Refugees in Chad, Summer 2004<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Individual Level</i>	X	s.d.
<i>Respondents Attributes</i>		
Age	37.100	14.634
Gender (Male = 1)	.400	.491
Zaghawa	.527	.500
Fur	.055	.288
Masalit	.275	.447
Jabel	.045	.208
<i>Attacking Groups</i>		
Janjaweed	.100	.300
Sudanese	.188	.391
Sudanese & Janjaweed	.672	.470
<i>Rebel Activity</i>		
Rebels in Town	.017	.130
Missing Rebel Data	.562	.496
<i>Particular Targets</i>		
Women	.070	.260
<i>Racial Intent</i>		
Individual Racial Intent	.343	.475
<i>Attacks</i>		
Bombing	.829	.727
First Peak	.266	.442
Second Peak	.499	.500
Victimization Severity	34.232	6.317
<i>Settlement Cluster Level</i>		
Settlement Density	.182	.151
Collective Racial Intent	.312	.144
Bombing	.861	.369
Rebel News Accounts	.318	.497

<sup>a</sup> N=932 individuals (level-1) and 22 settlement clusters (level-2).

**Table 2. Individual and Settlement Cluster Level Logistic Regression Models of Racial Intent Atrocities Documentation Survey, Darfur Refugees in Chad, Summer, 2004<sup>a</sup>**

<i>Individual Level</i>	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	<i>b(se)</i>	<i>Odds</i>	<i>b(se)</i>	<i>Odds</i>	<i>b(se)</i>	<i>Odds</i>
<i>Respondent</i>						
Age	-.005 (.005)	.994	-.005 (.005)	.995	-.005 (.005)	.995
Gender	.660*** (.178)	1.934	.666*** (.169)	1.947	.685*** (.170)	1.983
Zaghawa			.528 (.296)	1.696	.565 (.344)	1.759
Fur			.890* (.430)	2.434	.834* (.420)	2.302
Masalit			.733** (.281)	2.081	.692** (.285)	1.996
Jabel			.819** (.325)	2.268	.899** (.356)	2.445
<i>Attacking Groups</i>						
Janjaweed	.194 (.331)	1.214	.186 (.338)	1.205	.302 (.328)	1.353
Sudanese	-.316 (.340)	.729	-.397 (.324)	.672	-.348 (.302)	.706
Sudanese & Janjaweed	.517** (.197)	1.677	.410* (.209)	1.508	.467* (.229)	1.595
<i>Rebel Activity</i>						
Rebels in Settlement	-.977* (.457)	.376	-.946* (.493)	.388	-.941 (.502)	.390
Missing Rebel Data	-.352 (.225)	.703	-.289 (.251)	.749	-.275 (.250)	.760
<i>Particular Targets</i>						
Women	.296 (.347)	1.322	.243 (.369)	1.275	.239 (.376)	1.269
<i>Attacks</i>						
First Peak			-.628*** (.186)	.534	-.649*** (.186)	.523
Second Peak			.243 (.232)	1.275	.232 (.234)	1.261
<i>Settlement Cluster Level</i>						
Settlement Density					.603 (.796)	1.828
Rebel News					.138 (.335)	1.142

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
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Table 2. *Continued*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	
<i>Cross-Level Interaction</i>				
Sudanese & Janjaweed x Rebel News			.190 (.301)	<i>1.209</i>
Sudanese & Janjaweed x Settlement Density			2.063** (.845)	<i>7.873</i>
Intercept	-.725	-.725	-.736	

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<sup>a</sup> N= 932 individuals (level-1) and 22 settlement clusters (level-2).



**Figure 2. Cross-Level Interaction of Separate and/or Combined Forces with Settlement Density on Individual Racial Intent**

**Table 3. Individual and Settlement Cluster Models of Victimization Severity: Atrocities Documentation Survey, Darfur Refugees in Chad, Summer, 2004<sup>a</sup>**


<i>Individual Level</i>	<b>Model 1</b> <i>b(se)</i>	<b>Model 2</b> <i>b(se)</i>	<b>Model 3</b> <i>b(se)</i>	<b>Model 4</b> <i>b(se)</i>	<b>Model 5</b> <i>b(se)</i>	<b>Model 6</b> <i>b(se)</i>
<i>Respondent</i>						
Age	-.005** (.002)	-.004* (.002)	-.004* (.002)	-.004* (.002)	-.004* (.002)	-.004* (.002)
Gender	-.057 (.056)	-.138** (.055)	-.140** (.056)	-.132* (.058)	-.130* (.059)	-.136** (.058)
Zaghawa		-.023 (.105)	-.023 (.104)			
Fur		.321** (.125)	.257 (.153)			
Masalit		.265** (.099)	.012 (.167)			
Jabel		.224*** (.050)	.256*** (.060)	.174*** (.031)	.261*** (.047)	.214*** (.056)
<i>Attacking Groups</i>						
Janjaweed	.157 (.178)	.162 (.183)	.144 (.184)	.145 (.194)	.143 (.189)	.137 (.191)
Sudanese	.375** (.156)	.386** (.150)	.372** (.151)	.375** (.151)	.365** (.151)	.374** (.152)
Sudanese & Janjaweed	.509*** (.110)	.432*** (.116)	.422*** (.117)	.428*** (.121)	.416*** (.123)	.425*** (.125)
<i>Rebel Activity</i>						
Rebels in Settlement	.138 (.239)	.228 (.209)	.229 (.211)	.215 (.212)	.204 (.217)	.210 (.218)
Missing Rebel Data	-.330** (.111)	-.306*** (.085)	-.295*** (.085)	-.314*** (.094)	-.290** (.089)	-.286** (.088)
<i>Particular Targets</i>						
Women		.448*** (.086)	.442*** (.087)	.467*** (.093)	.462*** (.095)	.457*** (.094)
<i>Attacks</i>						
First Peak		.223** (.078)	.216** (.079)	.210** (.078)	.189** (.075)	.199** (.078)
Second Peak		.190* (.093)	.189* (.091)	.189* (.091)	.211** (.090)	.220** (.090)
Bombing		.061 (.045)	.067 (.045)	.054 (.043)	.051 (.037)	.058 (.041)
<i>Racial Intent</i>						
Individual Racial Intent		.387*** (.067)	.387*** (.087)	.394*** (.085)	.365*** (.083)	.367*** (.084)

(continued on next page)

*Table 3. Continued*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
<i>Settlement Cluster Level</i>						
Settlement Density				.686*	.449	.243
				(.316)	(.299)	(.405)
Bombing						-.137
						(.288)
Rebel News						-.032
						(.115)
Collective Racial Intent			1.225*		1.107*	1.066*
			(.565)		(.553)	(.518)
<i>Cross-Level Interaction</i>						
Bombing x Collective Racial Intent					.781**	.747*
					(.306)	(.341)
Bombing x Settlement Density					.131	.133
					(.156)	(.166)
Intercept	-.023	-.011	-.077	-.013	-.012	-.014

<sup>a</sup> N=932 Individuals (Level-1) and 22 Settlement Areas (Level-2)



**Figure 3. Cross-Level Interaction of Collective Racial Intent with Bombing on Victimization Severity**

## **Methodological Appendix: Sample Selection and Independent Variables**

*Sample Selection Issues:* Although death is a source of selectivity in our data, it is mitigated by the reporting by individuals about their *villages* as well as themselves and their families and the HLM modeling of the *collective* violence and its effects. Furthermore, since the victims are almost exclusively black Africans and at the hands of Arabs, and since this victimization increases in association with state involvement and racial epithets, the potential mortality bias is almost certainly either negligible or conservative with regard to the relationship of victimization with state involvement and racial epithets.

We have compared the population pyramids we constructed from this refugee sample with samples from displacement camps inside Darfur (Hagan and Raymond-Richmond 2007: Figures 5-6). These pyramids are similar with regard to age and gender composition; for example, in both Chad and Darfur there is a disproportionate absence of fighting-age men who are disproportionately reported killed. Thus there are no indications the Chadian refugees differ in significant ways from internally displaced Darfuris in the bordering areas of Sudan and Chad.

It is commonly said that the border between Chad and Darfur is literally “little more than a line in the sand.” Movement back and forth across this border in this part of Chad is very common, and this is why the State Department/USAID was interested in investing nearly a million dollars in this survey in Chad. It is also noteworthy that this sample includes both camps and resettlements, rather than camps alone. Finally, it should also be noted that many of the respondents in this survey are not victims in the sense of direct violent victimization. Thus this is not “merely” a survey of victims,

although all respondents are displaced. For that matter, almost the entire black African population of Darfur has been displaced, regardless of the side of the uncertain border on which they now are located. This makes the displaced on either side of the border an appropriate population to sample.

A much bigger consideration than sample selection bias is being able to ask sensitive questions that the Sudanese government doesn't want asked about rape and pre-camp violence in their internal displacement camps. This is the more important and unique value added by the ADS data from the Chadian side of the border.

*Independent Variable Measures:* Males make up 40 percent of the sample and are on average 37 years of age. Females probably predominate because they are more likely to be raped but survive; nearly ten percent of respondents reported that women were specifically targeted in the attacks. Just over half of the African individuals are self-identified as Zaghawa group members, just over a quarter are Masalit and about five percent each are Fur and Jebel.

Each survey narrative was read and coded by the authors to determine whether the attacking group was made up of Janjaweed, Sudanese, or combined Sudanese and Janjaweed forces. About two thirds of the attacks were joint Sudanese and Janjaweed operations, while nearly a fifth involved Sudanese and about one tenth involved the Janjaweed acting alone. The remaining attacks form the omitted comparison group. Making the Janjaweed the omitted category produced similar substantive results.

During the second two weeks of the survey, an item was added asking if there were rebels in the respondent's town or surrounding villages. Less than two percent of the sample reported a rebel presence, with these reports concentrated disproportionately

in several northern settlements. Half of the sample were not asked this question and thus were coded zero; we included a variable reflecting this missing data. A media study identified seven of the settlements as experiencing rebel activity and this was included as a cluster level measure (Petersen and Tullin 2006). The settlement level correlation between the respondent reports and the media survey classification was .4. We incorporate both measures in our analyses.

There were two peak periods of displacement in Darfur since February of 2003 (see Office of the Prosecutor 2007: Annex 3). We include two variables that indicate the first (June through August 2003) and second (December 2003 through March 2004) peak months of the conflict. The second of these peaks is thought to include the high point in Sudanese-Janjaweed attacks in Darfur.

The survey provides considerable detail in recording the shouting of racial epithets, our measure of racial motivation and intent, during the attacks. We recorded the content of the epithets as a detailed string variable, and we assigned each individual a binary code indicating hearing of racial epithets. About one third of the respondents reported racial epithets during the attacks. These epithets were explicit and offer concrete, first person evidence of dehumanizing racial motivation and intent. We analyze racial epithets at both the individual and mean settlement levels to indicate individual and collective racial motivation and intent predicted in Links 3a and 3b of Figure 1. The individual scores are binary “yes” or “no” reports of hearing racial epithets. The settlement scores are means of these reports, reflecting variation in the aggregation and concentration of these dehumanizing racial epithets at the settlement level.

In addition to news of rebel activity in an area and the mean level of racial epithets, the density of settlements is included as a third cluster level measure. The Darfur Investigation Team at the International Criminal Court provided this measure to the first author. U.N. reports of the number of settlements in an area are used as the numerator, with square kilometers of the area as the denominator. We multiplied this measure of settlement density per square kilometer by 10 to make its metric consistent with other measures in the analysis.

The population resource perspective does not regard settlement density as simply a control variable, but rather as a meaningful measure of criminal opportunity and incentive (see also Cohen and Felson 1979; Osgood et al. 1996) that reflects the presence of desirable property, including possessions, livestock and the settled land itself. Settlement of a land area effectively constitutes ownership in Darfur, and in a time of desertification, access to settled land is often a crucial resource for sustaining life. We therefore expect that victimization will increase in densely settled areas where opportunities and incentives are greatest and resources are potentially the most strained. This hypothesis is consistent with the Malthusian view of population growth applied to the Rwandan genocide by Jared Diamond (2005:313).

Since bombing is a method of attack that is a means as well as a form of victimization in itself, we chose to treat bombing as an independent variable. Only the Sudanese state possesses planes and bombs, and bombing is therefore a unique measure of the state's instrumental role in genocide. Individuals reported being bombed up to a maximum of seven times, with a mean of about one. The mean bombing score for each settlement is our fourth cluster level measure.

<sup>1</sup> The question of *why* Sudan indiscriminately attacks black Africans is in one sense simple: because Sudan can, and cheaply. Black African rebels are a threat. De Waal (2007) calls indiscriminate attacks “counter-insurgency on the cheap.” China and Russia sell Sudan the limited weaponry required to devastate the relatively defenseless black Africans, and China and Russia fend off the U.N. for trade advantages. So the larger question is: how does Sudan do genocide so efficiently? That is, *how does Sudan accomplish genocide?* In this sense, the answer to the question of *how* becomes the explanation of *why*.

<sup>2</sup> Most scholarly discussions of genocide focus on this concept as a noun. For example, Gurr and Harff (1994) advocate expanding genocide to include political conflicts. Others advocate including nonlethal acts that threaten group members (Lemkin 1946); emphasizing the role of the state (Horowitz 1980); highlighting one-sided killing by the state (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990); excluding ethnocide (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990); and specifying genocide as political mass murder (Chirot and Edwards 2003). These definitions are insightful in probing the boundaries of genocide, but our interest is more in understanding *how dehumanizing processes of collective racial and ethnic framing* drive genocidal victimization.

<sup>3</sup> The expanding research literature on genocide focuses on problems of definition (e.g., Fein 1990; Chirot and Edwards 2003), the identification of antecedents (e.g., Gurr and Harff 1994; Horowitz 2001), disputes about scale (e.g., Heuveline 2001; Hagan and

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Palloni 2006), the creation of typologies (e.g., Lemkin 1946; Chalk and Jonassohn 1990; Chirot and McCauley 2006), and the development of explanatory approaches considered below. Our distinctive focus is on the dehumanizing racial motivations and intentions that explain how a government mobilizes and collaborate in the ideological dehumanization and criminal victimization of a racial group.

<sup>4</sup> Article II of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” including in addition to killing, “deliberately inflicting on the groups conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”

<sup>5</sup> In support of the race based genocide claim, Chirot and McCauley (2006:89) insist that, “some of the worst ethnic genocides of the twentieth century involved targeting groups that were difficult to differentiate on physical or cultural grounds from the perpetrators.”

<sup>6</sup> Oberschall (2000: 989) defines a cognitive frame as “a mental structure which situates and connects events, people and groups into a meaningful narrative in which the social world that one inhabits makes sense and can be communicated and shared with others” (drawing on Snow et al. 1986; see also Benford and Snow 2000).

<sup>7</sup> This contrasts with the reframed “normalization” and mixing of American Jewish (Brodkin 1998) and Irish (Ignatiev 1995) identities as “white.”

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<sup>8</sup> It is important to distinguish the nomadic Arab groups of North Darfur-the Abbala- from the Arab groups in South Darfur- the Baggara. Four of the larger Baggara Arab tribes have land rights and have not engaged in the recent Darfur conflict (see Abdul-Jalil 2006). Many Abbala Arabs explain their role in the current conflict in terms of this 250-year-old search for land.

<sup>9</sup> Funding for the State Department survey flowed through the American Bar Foundation and the first author received permission and support to work with these data through his association with the American Bar Foundation.

<sup>10</sup> This description of the ADS sample is based on interviews with the field supervisor and lead survey methodologist for this study, as well as the detailed account provided by the latter (Howard 2006).

<sup>11</sup> To illustrate the coding, we describe a Masaleit woman who scored 52. Sudanese troops and Janjaweed militia attacked her village. Her report included 20 incidents from that day involving her, her family and village. During the attack, she was beaten, abducted and raped; her father was beaten and abducted; other village women were abducted, with some held and others not, but they were beaten and raped before being released. Another group of women were raped. Additional villagers were beaten, shot, and stabbed. She witnessed dead in the village and her village was pillaged and destroyed. She was displaced to Chad.

<sup>12</sup> Respondents reported an average of 1.72 rapes and 5.18 killings resulting from attacks on their settlements.

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<sup>13</sup> We explored sources of retrospective measurement error. It is plausible that less serious and less frequent events occurring earlier in the time frame would be less fully recalled. However, the correlations between the time since respondents fled from Darfur and reported seriousness of victimization and frequency of killings are respectively .017 and -.018 ( $P > .10$ ). It is also plausible that older respondents would less frequently have heard racial epithets. However, the correlation between age and epithets is .005 ( $P > .10$ ). The ADS interviews focused on recall of objective information (see Hagan and Palloni 1986; 2006).

<sup>14</sup> We adapted a dictionary definition of aggregation as “a combined whole” and a military definition of concentration as the massing of forces in a particular area in preparation for planned operations. Our point in linking these terms is to attend to both the joining of the epithets and their targeted assembly in particular places in preparation for attacks. This is a classically sociological collective process resulting in settlement wide violent consequences that are greater than could be expected solely from individual shouts of racial epithets. The collective consequences include the heightened vulnerability and fanatical fury that lead to genocidal violence.

<sup>15</sup> Table 2 also indicates the epithets are also more likely to be heard by men than women ( $B = .660, p < .001$ ). This is probably because women are less likely to know Arabic.

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<sup>16</sup> Although reported frequencies of killings and rapes are less reliable than the severity scale, the results of using these measures are interesting. The cross-level interaction effect of collective racial motivation and intent and bombing is stronger and more significant when numbers of killings is substituted for the severity scale as the outcome. However, this cross-level interaction is weaker and non-significant for numbers of rapes (both killings and rapes are estimated from one to 10 or more). For rape, the main effect of collective racial motivation and intent remains salient. Note that while bombs obviously can kill, only persons can rape.

<sup>17</sup> Several sources (see Flint and de Waal 2005:106; Steidle and Wallace 2007:188) also cite documentary evidence of the state instigation and authorization of these racialized attacks led by Hilal.

<sup>18</sup> The interview can be heard at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/nolavconsole/ukfs\\_news/](http://news.bbc.co.uk/nolavconsole/ukfs_news/) and read at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6060856.stm>.

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## Biography

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