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The Cambridge conference had "tested the waters" with
regard to US-Soviet discussions of the missile crisis. Now it was
time to jump in, and go to Moscow for discussions with senior Soviet
decision makers. At breakfast, just before the start of the conference,
Ted Sorensen, Bob McNamara, and Mac Bundy are reviewing recently
declassified documents describing Operation Mongoose. They had not
seen these documents since 1962. At the first session, a member
of the Cuban delegation would read an excerpt from these documents
into the record:
"(1) Operation Mongoose will evolve according to the following
assumptions: (a) After executing the overthrow of the government
in question, the U.S. will make maximum use of native [Cuban]
resources, internal and external, but it recognizes that the final
outcome will require the decisive military intervention of the
U.S. (b) Its native resources, such as they are developed, will
be utilized to prepare for or justify the intervention and therefore
facilitate or support it."
This document I have read is dated March 14, 1962.
This is an early version of what we now describe as "regime
change."


On the Soviet side, the two most senior participants were Anatoly
Dobrynin, who was the Soviet Ambassador to the US during the crisis,
and Andre Gromyko, who was the Soviet Foreign Minister. Gromyko
was one of only 6 Soviet officials who knew about the installation
of the missiles; Dobrynin was not one of those six. During the conference,
Gromyko (whose nickname was "Old Stoneface") turned to
Dobrynin and said, "I didn't tell you about the missiles? Oh,
... it must have been a very big secret!" This was followed
by a roar of laughter throughout the room.


The big surprise of the Moscow conference was the presence of the
Cuban delegation. To this point, the received wisdom was that the
missile crisis was a superpower confrontation, with Cuba being nothing
but a bystander. The Cuban delegation was there to refute that view.
The photo includes three people with whom Jim and janet would subsequently
work for many years -- Rafael Hernandez (second from the left, researcher
from the Center for the Study of the Americas), Jose Antonio Arbesu
(second from the right; he would later become Chief of the Cuban
Interests Section in Washington, DC the equivalent of Cuban Ambassador
to the US, if the US and Cuba had normal diplomatic relations),
and Jorge Risquet (a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party
in Cuba). |
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Organizing and producing an international critical oral history
conference is a major undertaking that involves collaboration with
many institutions and many people. For the Moscow conference, our
chief partner in Moscow was IMEMO (Institute of World Economy and
International Relations). During the conference, 9 young researchers
from IMEMO were "on duty," round the clock to deal with
the many issues that come up during a conference. They had a suite
-- command central -- at the conference site. Here is the sign that
was on their door. Note that in the Soviet Union (now Russia), the
event is not called "the Cuban missile crisis." Rather,
it is called "The Caribbean Crisis" -- an indication that
in their view, it was not "the missiles" that caused this
crisis.


The organizing group from IMEMO were fabulous! During the course
of the conference we were a fully functioning international team.
We confronted an array of problems and worked together to solve
them. By the end of the conference, having all gone through a kind
of scholarly version of "outward bound," we were friends
-- special friends. On our last night in Moscow, we celebrated together.
One friend stayed up all night to paint a picture for us -- which
still hangs in our bedroom. Others gave us albums of Russian music,
and even baby pictures! Toward the end of the evening, they showed
us how to make the "Komsomol salute" -- the salute that
began the meetings of "young communists" that they participated
in as children. Pictured here, with Jim Blight and janet Lang are
Eugene Danilov, Eugene Schagarin, Anna Padryan, Masha Vanjan and
Boris Sorochinsky.
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