Transcript: Frederic Grare

Conducted on August 1, 2007, by Jebediah Koogler and Henry Shepherd.

FG:My name is Frederic Grare. I'm a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment. I was previously based in Pakistan for about three years, between 2003 and the end of 2005, and before that I spend four years in India, as well. So I've got a background, seven years, living in South Asia.

HS:What are you working on in research now?

FG:Well, I'm still working on South Asia, essentially, but mostly on three countries: India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, and their relations with the rest of the world, of course. That's what I mainly work on. And I try to expand a bit on Bangladesh, as well, but it is essentially through its connection with Pakistan and through its impact on India and the overall regional stability.

JK: To start out here with our first question: how would you define or characterize America's stance towards Pakistan since 9/11?

FG:As complete nonsense. That's, of course, a provocation, but... there is this obsession with the War on Terrorism, and this obsession has totally obscured the fact that we are with a regime that is constantly playing a double game. And you are asking this regime to cooperate with the U.S. where it has absolutely no interest in cooperating, but in practical terms, it has declined in several issues. And because people look at all of those issues separately, then the whole picture is quite confused, because we see a Pakistan which is cooperating in some aspects and which seems to be not cooperating in other aspects, okay?

Let me be more specific here. If you look at the situation in Kashimir, you have undoubtedly some progress made over the past, I'd say, two years, okay? It is not clear yet whether it is a tactical move on the part of Pakistan or whether it is a paradigm shift, because in 2005, after three years of relative calm, we suddenly had a new upsurge in infiltration, while at the same time militants in Kashimir were telling everybody wanting to listen that they were being trained on the replica of defense which had been built on the [unclear]. Okay, that's one aspect. But, undoubtedly, there has been some progress since then. At the same time, the very same terrorist infrastructure which has been used in Kashimir has not been dismantled at all. Take the speech of January 12 by Pervez Musharraf. He announces the dismantling of a number of groups. Those groups, as soon as they were banned, were renamed and continued to operate. I'm thinking in particular of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Jamaat-ud-Dawa is just a new name for the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

Well, this fact--that the terrorist infrastructure has not been dismantled--is important in the overall picture, though I'll come to it later. If you look at what Pakistan does in international terrorism, undoubtedly there, too, there has been some cooperation. Pakistan understands very well, that those guys are a liability for its own foreign policy, and they are trying to hand them over in exchange for some Western [word inaudible]. On the other side, what Pakistan wants is the protection of the groups which it selects in the places which it does consider more important for itself: the Taleban, Lashkar-e-Taiba that we mentioned, and so on. So there, there is no cooperation; there we see absolutely nothing, but because the do cooperate in the War on Terror, or whatever we may call that, then we think, 'Oh, well, this is confusing. Perhaps there is an intelligence agency which is not cooperating, or not obeying the order of its government, and that kind of crap. I mean, this is a system which works pretty efficiently. The intelligence agency, like every intelligence agency all over the world, have got some rogue elements, but rogue elements do not make a policy. And there we do have a state policy.

Now, if you take the whole thing, you see what? You see a Pakistan which is ready to literally blackmail the international community by saying, 'Look, if you don't give me the leeway wherever I think it is important for me, Pakistan--in Afghanistan or inside Pakistan in Baluchistan--then I'm going to look the other way when it comes to international terrorism. And that is where the key element that they have maintained some terrorist infrastructure is very telling, is extremely important. And that is why I say this U.S. policy is nonsense, because it is trying to avoid, from the very beginning, the inescapable fact that we are facing a state policy, and that if you don't address the political question, then you have absolutely no chance of resolving the issue. Not that if you do address the political question, this will disappear just overnight. But there you place yourself in a dilemma which is simply inextricable. And that's where we've been so far. If you look at almost all U.S. publications since then, you see a tendency to try to address the question technically, or through development means, all of rubbish which is being said about development in the FATA being susceptible to reduce terrorism. Terrorism doesn't exist there because of the poverty. I'm not saying here that development is not important, but these are to large extents separate issues. Of course, there is a link, of course it's easier to recruit people if the come from a totally deprived background, but the link is not automatic. And if you look at who does carry out international terrorism, we are not talking of deprived people. If this is a revolution, this is a very petite-bourgeoisie one-- and that kind of thing. And that's why I say, in a quite provocative manner, that this is nonsense, that's what I meant by that.

JK: How sympathetic do you think Pakistanis are towards this type of anti-Western radicalism?

FG:Well, they are not.... A few people in Pakistan, like everywhere, are anti-Western because they don't like Western values, because they don't believe in it. And to a point, they are right. Every society does generate its own extremism, its own anti-values, if I may call them that way, okay? And Pakistan is no exception. But most of Pakistan tends to become anti-Western because the West does support a regime which is oppressing them on the one side, and on the other side is helping precisely the kind of extremists that we all ask them to combat. And this has an impact of course in Afghanistan, this has an impact directly at home for the Pakistanis, and you should understand, too, that for the average Pakistani al-Qaeda is not so much an issue. This is not from al-Qaeda that they suffer. They suffer from a kind of constant repression that they get due to the role of the mullah, due to other sectarian groups that are affecting their daily lives much deeper than any of those international groups are doing. For us of course the perspective is radically opposed.

JK: After the Red Mosque siege, do you think the Pakistani people's perception of Islamists and of Musharraf has changed? And if so, in what way?

FG:No, it should be confirmed. And it did confirm what I just told you. You don't have to look at the Lal Masjid, per se. This is again a misperception, because we tend to focus only on the most radical segment. And as spectacular as it may be, this is not the main issue, again, for the Pakistanis. But if you look at the sequence of events since March 9, then you see a Pakistani society which in its vast majority is pro-democracy on the one side, and through the Lal Masjid incident, is deeply anti-radicalism. So they do criticize Musharraf and strongly criticize Musharraf and the army because he is a military dictator and on that specific incident they did support him because for once he was finally combatting Islamic radicalism. So you do have a society which by and large is close to what we would eventually call Western values, and we have a policy which is to support the repression of those very people? Tell me it is not nonsense.

JK: If Musharraf were to further crack down on some of these militant groups, what do you think the implications would be domestically?

FG:Well, before cracking down on the extremist groups, there is the very fact that he has been helping-- and he was not the first one, not the last one, probably, unfortunately-- but it was the very fact that he did promote them. Not promoting them would have been a way of cracking down, because we again tend to see everything in military terms. There is all of the political game that is going on before that, which again leads to a sequence that we've seen so far where military intervention become inevitable, although even in the Lal Masjid incident, there was nothing inevitable if you just look at things as they are: there is a mosque located in the very center of Islamabad not even half a mile from from the diplomatic enclave in a district which is absolutely full of cops. So it was absolutely impossible that things which [have taken] place didn't take place without the knowledge of whoever was there so it would have been possible to prevent things. But at the end, the sequence was such that it became inevitable. But if he does crack down-- let's say that now, he changes his mind-- then of course there will be some repercussions. That's what we see: we see a series of suicide attacks, there will be all kind of attacks of all sorts, there will be some price to pay, but at the same time, there is no political compulsion not to do it, because what the incident at Lal Masjid demonstrated precisely is that he has the support of the vast majority of the population.

Now don't forget also another aspect of it. There is what we could call the institutional Islamist opposition which by and large supports the regime. If you just read the Pakistani newspaper this morning, The Daily Times, and a sort of statement that the head of the GUI did, there is absolutely no doubt as to the close connection between the Islamists and the regime. Then, why not use also those people, by accepting them in the game? Because, after all, you guys didn't like communist parties, but communist parties were a part of European politics for years and by being in the parliament they were probably weaker than they would have been otherwise. Actually when somebody like Francois Mitterand, putting them in the government, it was the best way for them to destroy them almost forever, and that is what we see now. You can have a similar policy with the Islamists in a country like Pakistan, especially since, in elections in the past, they never did more than 12 percent, and that was when they were in connection with other right-wing parties, and only with the support of the regime. The 2002 election which [were] rigged and largely manipulated by the regime, once again, they got only 11.1 percent. So they don't have the support that you imagine. So there is the support in the population for getting rid of those people. And even there they will have some support, they will have a constituency, and there is to some extent nothing really wrong with that, providing they do accept the rules of the game. And that is where we should insist, rather than targeting them.

JK: I want to come back to this issue of democracy and what democracy might look like in Pakistan if it were reinstituted. Before we get there, I want to ask you briefly what you think are the threats that Musharraf sees to his regime.

FG:Well, the pro-democracy movement, clearly. You know, he had... that was totally unexpected for him, that was not, for example, the first time that there were interferences with the judiciary. Nawaz Sharif, his predecessor, had sacked, also, a chief justice. And nothing of the kind happened. So that was a major, major surprise. He did so because he feared, and probably rightfully so, that the chief justice would declare his holding of the chief of army staff and president unconstitutional, which he is likely to do now, which is going to lead to another interesting situation. But let's say that... that is what he feared the most. And what have we seen, what have we seen? All of a sudden he gets this reaction from the street, and all of a sudden the regime starts exploding. And we could say that there is of course a connection, but there is not direct pressure of the street which leads to the collapse of the regime. The regime is imploding from within because it overreacted to a threat that he had not anticipated and that he was the least likely to expect. So a we see a Musharraf who does mistake after mistake, who does antagonize its own population more and more, who does antagonize his own army, who does antagonize, actually, the entire society, including its political base, the PMLQ, with which relations were pretty uneasy to start with but to whom he says, 'Well, you are absolutely of no use, you let me down every time I needed you.' I mean, whatever he thought at that moment, it was not a very smart statement, to say the least.

So here is a regime who virtually had no support at the end of it but the military. And the military, he was not completely sure if it would keep supporting it. So that is where the main danger comes for him. The terrorist threat is something else, something that he can probably contain. There is always a risk involved, yes, but that is not the main threat for him. That is not where the main danger is. The main danger for the regime is the pro-democracy movement.

JK: At this point, given that there seems to be a large pro-democracy movement within Pakistan, how likely do you think it is that the Musharraf government will fall or will be forced to cede power to a civilian government?

FG:Well, in fact, it is very likely. I don't see how it could survive politically. There is a very, very small possibility that it does survive, but, I mean, but he would certainly have to be smarter than he has been so far. And what he is doing now, trying to meet civilian leaders-- there have been no deals so far, by the way-- but meeting civilian leaders to try to enlarge his base, try to open up a bit, is a way to get out of it. But we always tend to undermine the personality factor in that kind of situation, and I would like to see when we will have Musharraf eventually and Benazir or somebody else together in the same government, how long this is going to last. Now, what the role of the army will be is also a decisive factor, and there we don't know exactly where it stands. So I don't think that his chances of staying in power are very great. Now, when it is going to place, that's difficult to see.

JK: Given the checkered past of democracy in Pakistan...

FG:What democracy?

JK: Well, perhaps I could say the periods of civilian rule in Pakistan...

FG:Which is slightly different...

JK: Absolutely. My question would be, as a follow-up to that, do you think that democracy, or perhaps a stronger democracy, is viable in Pakistan at this time?

FG:Well, what you are asking me is whether Pakistan is ready for democracy, but let me tell you that no society is ready for democracy until it gets it. And Pakistan is just like everyone else. Democracy is a process that people learn also by doing, in a sense. Pakistan has another problem, which is not only a military regime, but the very, very tiny elite which is basically in bed with the military. And to some extent you could include part of the civilian leadership we are constantly talking about these days, if you look at their own career. And I said before that we can't really speak of democracy because it was essentially a civilian facade to a regime which was still controlled by the military. When Benazir came back in 1988, she had to act within a framework defined by the military. And Nawaz himself was a product of the military. Nawaz went the other way, in a sense. Nawaz tried to, in a way, distance himself from them, and did not do it in a very smart way, because it did eliminate all of the possibilities of, let's say, sort of peaceful transition in case of trouble, and he had to pay a price for it. Moreover, he did antagonize the military probably too directly. I'm not saying he should not have, I'm just saying that whenever you want to that, you have to be smart enough to understand what the real balance of power is. And that is probably where he has made major mistakes, that he does recognize now, by the way.

So, what are the chances for democracy to survive? Difficult to say, but I would say that the goal in the first place should be to reestablish a political space which is so far non-existent, and from that political space, whenever it is created, try to expand and try to reform structurally all of the institutions and gradually the society. It is not something that can be imposed overnight. I don't think anybody should have sort of a neo-con agenda for Pakistan, or anything like that. This is and has to be a gradual process. First of all, it will be acclimatized by the Pakistanis themselves. It will include the culture, and so on. But there is absolutely no reason, either, to believe that this is not possible. And there will be other crises. This will be a very imperfect democracy. So what? So what?

JK: Clearly the United States has a good deal of leverage over Pakistan, what with the amount of aid we give them and the amount of reliance that Pakistan puts on the United States. How do you think the Bush Administration can strengthen democracy in Pakistan, or play a positive role in a transition towards a stronger democracy?

FG:Well, it would have to change its politics, to start with. From the very beginning of the whole thing, we have administration officials saying [that] they do support Musharraf, they do support Musharraf, they do support Musharraf, and that is why I also said that this obsession with the War on Terror, as understandable as it can be, its own purpose, to some extent, is nonsense because it leads to a series of mistakes which are totally counterproductive. So the Bush administration would have to totally reverse its own policy and look at things from the inside. And, well, I'm not sure that the Bush administration would have to do something, but at least they will have to stop supporting the military dictatorship. And that will probably be enough to change things.

HS:You know, if the way American policy was being generated miraculously or quickly changed, and sort of a new slate were possible, is there a way that the United States could affect is happening domestically in Pakistan and internationally in the region, relating to Pakistan, maybe, specifically, that you would see having a more beneficial impact on the way the United States construes its security interests in the region?

FG:What is the United States policy in Pakistan, for example? It is support, massive support, to the military, direct and indirect, and almost nothing for the society itself. So, yes, just stopping support to the military would not be sufficient but would be a great step if the same amount could be spent on something else directly related to the society, education, and so on that would make a huge difference. But, I mean, realize also one thing: the future of Pakistan depends on the Pakistanis. And reestablishing a kind of confidence that could lead to that kind of thing is not going to be an easy process, but this is not impossible. And this is true elsewhere, this is true elsewhere. I think that people here just underestimate the disastrous impact of Iraq, whether Iraq has a direct connection with whatever country we may be talking about, or not. I mean, there has been a loss of credibility of the U.S. The U.S. does not impress people anymore, as it used to be. There has been a loss of credibility in U.S. values. And people tend to exaggerate the other way, as well, but this has been a complete disaster for U.S. policy.

HS:I think the further questions would be along the lines of talking about whether the way the United States, you know, government, political leadership, construes its safety and the safety of the American people, undermines the actual pursuit of a policy that would make the United States more safe in the long term. But is sort of a, maybe a circular question that begs its own answer.

FG:Well, let me return the question. What is the way the U.S. government pursues the security of its own people? What is it? I mean, tell me how it does help to support a military regime? From a technical point, it makes sense to have the military helping you, but tell me a democratic country which doesn't have, for example, an army. Except that the army is built into civilian leadership, which is being elected and so on and is an expression of the nation and is accountable to the nation, can be changed and all of the rest of it. And tell me in which category you get, for example, the best intelligence: in a regime where the vast majority is opposed, in a country where the vast majority of the population is opposed to the regime that you are supporting, because you are supporting it, or in a country where this regime, which is an expression of the nation, takes people along, explains unpopular decisions... can still mobilize part of the population behind themselves? Well, where are we, exactly? So if it comes to radicals who come to you, for whom you don't necessarily have a common sympathy but with whom you will eventually vaguely identify because you have the same opponent at some point. And believe me, people are uncomfortable with terrorism in Pakistan. That's not the point. But they just don't understand why they should support the U.S., as well. And this is true in other parts of the world.

HS:As I am sure you are all too familiar with, there is a practice, certainly over the last six years, of Americans, even American thinkers, sitting around and wondering, Well, what would happen if the U.S. were to invade or to carry out air strikes against... and then you fill in the blank. Do you have any sense about what would actually happen were the United States to carry out air strikes or possibly even have incursions over the border into the tribal areas?

FG:Well, it depends on the scope of the strikes, of course, but if you do act unilaterally in part of the country, what will happen? You just clearly tell your population, well, the population of the country concerned, the army of the country concerned, and the political opposition of the country concerned, that the guy to whom you are doing that is basically useless. Now, if we speak of a larger attack-- which could happen, this is not impossible at all, I mean, just imagine the consequences of a new 9/11. Let's say that in July, 2006, the planes exploded over the Atlantic. What are the consequences? I mean, the pressure, at least, for some sort of military intervention, would have been there. Then if you do move that way, you are destroying the very regime that you have been trying to protect for so many years and you eliminate all of your margin of maneuver. So you go from a policy which consists of support a regime which is harming your own interests but supporting it at any costs because you think that flawed cooperation is better than no cooperation at all, to the other extreme, but you never consider the very possibility to force that regime to change and make the necessary adjustments so as to avoid that kind of situation. In other words, you try to avoid the political question at any cost and it comes back to you politically in a much more dramatic manner. And that is my fear about Pakistan, for example.

JK: Some analysts who write about Pakistan and this region say that if Pakistan were to transition to civilian rule and to transition to a stronger democracy it would be detrimental to American interests in the short term, but in the long term it would be beneficial, because, as you noted, it would likely undermine the support for the Taleban and the more radical elements. Do you think that this is a valid analysis?

FG:Why should it be detrimental in the short term?

JK: What I have read suggests that, in the short term, if you transition to civilian rule that you'd have to create a coalition that would include elements of these radical groups which would be more hesitant to go after its own constituency. And to add to that, there is the idea that if there was...

FG:No, but underneath that there is a perception that even that constituency is extremist. And a great number of people do support movements such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, such as the Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam, and other groups who are clearly Islamist: they do want an Islamist state, not necessarily supporting terrorism or that kind of thing, so this very idea is false to start with. Second, there is always behind this sort of analysis the belief that, by and large, because the population is largely religiously conservative it will necessarily go towards extremism, or at least there is a risk that they may. Well, these are two different processes. People are religiously conservative in Pakistan, and yet they are opposed to extremism. No one wants to die, whether you are Muslim or not. No one wants to suffer, whether you are Muslim or not. If you are father mother, you don't want your kids to get killed for rubbish. You always get a few excited ones, no doubt, but this is not the majority of the population. So why do you harm your interests in the short term? Well, I'll tell you where you harm your interests in the short term. It does suppose that you are against the army because you want to force it out of power and bring it back to where it should be, which is not a non-existent role but which is the role of an army in any normal country. And there, that is where the risk is, but no one will use the argument. Everybody is afraid that actually the army will stop is cooperation and because it has stopped its cooperation, then you have a risk because of what I mentioned at the very beginning of our conversation, which is those terrorist infrastructures not being watched again, anymore. And therefore the risk would be carried out. But if precisely... if something has to be advocated as a kind of adjustment, as a kind of pressure that would bring the army back but keep the army its job, which funnily enough now that it is in power it's not really doing.

JK: Well, thank you very much.

FG:My pleasure.