

On Democratization and Peacebuilding

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The two sub-fields addressed in this article did not exist twenty years ago. Scholars had only begun to analyze the beginnings of the “third wave” of democratization in the early 1980s, and the term “peacebuilding” only gained currency in the 1990s. By the early twenty-first century, the study of democracy and democratization had firmly become a sub-field of political and sociological inquiry, as evidenced by the emergence of research centers and journals on the subject. “Peacebuilding” enjoyed a rapid rise, especially in policy circles, without the same degree of institutionalization. Nevertheless, it is surprising that international relations specialists only recently began to pay more rigorous attention to the relationship between “peacebuilding” and political governance, and more specifically the extensive research on democratization.

In this article, we analyze the relationship between these two growing sub-fields. Our claims rest partly on papers presented at a conference held on this topic at Brown University’s Watson Institute for International Studies in April 2002.¹ We highlight a central dilemma facing actors seeking to establish or improve post-conflict governance.

On the one hand, both the concepts and policies associated with international post-war political reconstruction have become broader, more sweeping and more intrusive in recent years. The concept of “peacebuilding” now means not only keeping former enemies from going back to war, but also addressing the root causes of conflict and even fostering development in non-postwar societies. In practice, the international community is more bound and determined to create democratic political regimes in post-war settings, recreating the core institutions of state and society largely along Western lines of thought. The largest donors and international organizations have coalesced around a standard post-war political package that Marina Ottaway calls the “democratic reconstruction model,” involving constitution-making, elections within two years of the end of hostilities, funding for civil society, and extensive state institution-building². The post-conflict political agenda has very positive elements, especially as it signifies a departure from the great powers’ persistent tendency to embrace dictators for strategic reasons.

On the other hand, implementation of the prevailing “democratic reconstruction model” has proven problematic. Of the 18 single countries that experienced U.N. peacekeeping missions with a political institution-building component between 1988 and

¹ The conference, “Building Democracy after War?: ‘State-of-the-Art’ Thinking about Governance and Peacebuilding”, was held in Providence, RI, 3-4 April 2002, hereafter “Brown conference”.

² Marina Ottaway, “The Post-War ‘Democratic Reconstruction Model’: Why it Can’t Work.” Paper presented at the Brown conference.

2002, thirteen (72%) were classified as some form of authoritarian regime as of 2002.³ The majority of these regimes represented clear improvements over their immediate predecessors, but failed to meet the high expectations of international observers or local populations.

The difficulties of post-conflict democratization pose a number of questions. Do they signify a failure of the international community, because of either insufficient resources or poor choices? Or are Western models of liberal democracy simply an inappropriate model? Conversely, should partial success be emphasized, recognizing that many years are required for democratic consolidation and that expectations should be lowered? Ottaway argues that the international community appears unwilling to commit the economic, political and military resources necessary to implement the model in any given society. Indeed important research shows that applying the model, or *misapplying* it, can fuel setbacks to pluralism, such as armed conflict, and even genocide.⁴

In this essay we consider the implications of literature on democratization and peacebuilding for these questions. We argue that not only do peacebuilding and democratization specialists need to better learn from one another, but that improved outcomes are possible with greater resources, longer time horizons, and careful consideration of democratic governance models in each case. The shortcomings of the democratic reconstruction model require that more attention be paid to specific and local context, and integration of appropriate external governance models with local, legitimate practices in war-torn societies. Ours is not a naïve call for greater local participation, but recognition of the hard work needed to ensure that national models of governance cohere with and selectively build on local institutions. To date, international and national officials, bound by short timelines and resource limitations, have tended to uncritically implement external models without careful consideration of the full range of options or assessment of pre-existing local institutions.

This article begins by examining the relationship between current peacebuilding literature and prevailing ideas about democratization. After discussing these concepts, it identifies salient points of convergence, then divergence, and finally the important gaps between the two literatures. It closes with some suggestions for further avenues of research and conceptualization for rethinking democracy promotion in war-torn societies.

CONCEPTUALIZING "PEACEBUILDING" AND "DEMOCRACY"

³ These countries were Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Congo (Kinshasa), East Timor, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Tajikistan. The list of UN missions is from the United Nations official website, excluding multi-country missions (e.g., UNPROFOR), those which had no political institution-building component (e.g., Cyprus), and the ambiguous polity of Kosovo. Regime classifications come from Andreas Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation," and Larry Diamond, "Thinking about Hybrid Regimes," both in *Journal of Democracy* 13,2 (April 2002):21-50. Four countries (El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique and Namibia) were electoral democracies, and only one (Croatia) was considered a liberal democracy.

⁴ Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: Norton, 2000).

Before examining the relationship between current thinking about “democratization” and “peacebuilding,” some conceptual clarity is necessary. What exactly demarcates the “peacebuilding literature”? Widely divergent notions of “peacebuilding” exist. Here we identify three strains of “peacebuilding literature”. First, many scholars rely upon the currency given the term by Boutros Ghali’s 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, which viewed peacebuilding as post-conflict social and political reconstruction activities aimed at avoiding “a relapse into conflict” (para. 55). Efforts at society-wide reconciliation and state-building in societies emerging from armed conflict are the hallmarks of this approach, distinguishing post-conflict peacebuilding from “peacekeeping” and “peacemaking.”

Building on Johan Galtung’s work⁵ and the peace studies field, a second subset of the peacebuilding literature emphasizes conflict prevention and resolution initiatives at levels beyond or below the state. If the prior set of peacebuilding works focuses mainly on elites, this set emphasizes non-elite processes. It conceptualizes social, psychological, religious and other dimensions of conflict resolution processes operating at the local or community level.

In contrast to these first two concepts of “peacebuilding,” a third set of scholars uses the term to refer broadly to issues of peacekeeping, peacemaking and conflict prevention. Like Elisabeth Wood in her review essay below, these scholars reject (at least implicitly) the idea that prevention activities in “post-conflict societies” differ systematically from conflict prevention and war termination processes in any other society. It is therefore difficult to distinguish this subset of peacebuilding research from the larger literature on peacekeeping and civil war termination.

In this article, we refer mainly to the first strain of peacebuilding literature, which comprises the greatest number of books and articles dealing with peacebuilding. At the same time, this literature has been theoretically uneven, empirically weak, and highly prescriptive. Only now are we seeing both rigorous quantitative work and some attempts at cross-regional qualitative comparative research.⁶

While scholarly work on peacebuilding is still contending with strikingly different conceptions of the term, less debate surrounds the concept of “democratization.” Ten years ago, the democratization sub-field was rent between advocates of a definition circumscribed to “political democracy” versus critics who sought a broader definition of democracy that incorporates social and economic conditions. The political democracy

⁵ John Galtung, “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding,” in his *Peace, War and Defense – Essays in Peace Research*, Vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Christian Eljers, 1975), pp. 282-304.

⁶ Krishna Kumar (ed.), *Rebuilding Societies After Civil War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press, 1997); Elisabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar, *Peacebuilding as Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth M. Cousens, *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

approach has emerged increasingly hegemonic, at least as a means of comparative analysis of democracy (witness the contributions in this volume). We therefore use this narrower definition of democracy as free and fair electoral competition with minimal civil rights guarantees, partly because it is the most common understanding of the term and partly because it permits examination of causal relations with social and economic variables.⁷ At the same time, social, economic and cultural critiques remain as vociferous and relevant as ever. These critiques lead us to use the term “governance” to refer to more plural notions of political arrangements at the state, substate, intrastate and suprastate level.⁸

THE “PEACEBUILDING” AND “DEMOCRATIZATION” LITERATURES: POINTS OF CONVERGENCE

What is the current state of thinking about the relationship between peacebuilding and governance? We begin by examining points of convergence between the literatures on peacebuilding and democratization. Of course, diversity characterizes all sub-fields, and generalizations are dangerous. Yet in the name of stimulating dialogue between those who study democratization and those who study post-conflict peacebuilding, we believe it is useful to make some general claims.

First, both literatures reflect a liberal presumption. Despite protests to the contrary, democratization theory suffers from some of the flaws of modernization theory, including its tendency to view the West’s experience as both normative yardstick and empirical expectation. This literature’s preference for liberal characteristics over non-liberal ones and its assumption that transitions from authoritarianism will lead to something resembling democracy have recently received criticism.⁹ More egregious is the simplifying tendency of democracy promoters to assume inevitability and linearity.¹⁰ Peacebuilding literature, too, has suffered from assumptions that transitions occur linearly and that political and economic individualistic arrangements, rather than ones recognizing social groups, are optimal for ensuring stable and good governance. Despite important strains emphasizing non-elite actors, the best known works of both literatures have emphasized the primacy of elite processes.

⁷ Our definition of democracy includes the four elements delineated by Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Anibal Perez Linan, “Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999,” *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36 (Spring 2001), viz., regular free and fair elections, political and civil rights necessary to ensure the former, adult suffrage without regard for ethnicity or creed, and effective authority for those elected.

⁸ See our definition of “governance” in note #3 of the introduction to this special issue.

⁹ See Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transitions Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, 1 (January 2002): 5-21, which overlooks some works that explicitly point to alternatives to presumed transition endpoints, such as Terry Lynn Karl, “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America,” *Journal of Democracy* 6 (July 1995): 72-86. Larry Diamond offers a worthy attempt to get beyond the transitions paradigm, defining new regime types in “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” *Journal of Democracy* 13, 2 (April 2002): 21-35.

¹⁰ Carothers, *ibid.*

Related to the liberal presumption is the underlying assumption of much research on peacebuilding and democratization that “all good things go together.”¹¹ The peacebuilding literature is rife with conceptual frameworks prescribing a host of measures that will ensure popular support for new government structures, be they new rights protections, electoral schemes, disarmament plans, refugee repatriation, or police and justice reforms. It is remarkable how little attention is given to contradictions likely to emerge from this array of reforms to state and society. Analysts overlook tensions between elite interests in reformed governance on the one hand, and greater participation of marginalized populations or an end to impunity on the other. Although the democratization literature is less prone to this assumption, many of its prescriptions assume that human rights protections, protection of elite interests, mass participation, and the rule of law can all proceed without negatively affecting one another.¹²

The peacebuilding and democratization literatures have abandoned some of their more simplistic features in recent years. Both reflect a shift away from a focus on singular events or achievements toward more open-ended processes. Peacebuilding, for instance, has moved beyond a focal point of peace agreements, which are now seen as starting points rather than the end of wars, as peace implementation has received more attention.¹³ Similarly, the insistence by some democratization theorists to move beyond elections as the defining feature of democracy has finally found echo in policy circles, as other avenues of participation and civil society have received emphasis. In both cases, the shift away from single focal events has enhanced the value of theory. Related to this shift is an increasing awareness of the importance of the state.¹⁴

In post-conflict governance, both peace and democratization literatures now share an acceptance of local-level electoral events. Recent interim administrations in Kosovo, East Timor, and Afghanistan have convened local elections or assemblies well before national-level elections in an effort to enhance local participation, to bolster institutions and civil rights guarantees before a new government takes office, and to diffuse winner-take-all elections. Peacebuilding theorists are already moving beyond a focus on national-level elections as the point at which the process is considered a success. As recent works in democratization illustrate, a newfound emphasis on justice and the rule of

¹¹ Robert Packenham identified the misplaced assumption that “all good things go together” in *Liberal America in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

¹² Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). One exception is the acknowledgment of tensions between liberal political reforms and neoliberal economic reforms. See Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism” *International Security* 22,2(Fall 1997):54-89; and Nancy Bermeo (ed.), *Liberalization and Democratization: Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

¹³ See Nicole Ball, “The Challenge of Rebuilding War-Torn Societies,” in Chester Crocker and Fen Hampson (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996); and Stephen J. Stedman, Donald Rothchild and Elizabeth Cousens, 2002.

¹⁴ Rueschemeyer, “After State Failure: Some Hypotheses and Guesses.” Paper presented at the Brown conference.

law also permeates political analysis in the twenty-first century.¹⁵ These themes, long neglected in comparative analysis and in policy circles, are likely to continue holding a higher place in analysis of post-conflict governance. Finally, both the peacebuilding and democratization literatures assume that peace and security are preconditions for democratization. Although wars often spark democratization, all agree that the war must be over for democratic consolidation to have a chance.

PEACEBUILDING AND DEMOCRATIZATION LITERATURES: POINTS OF DIVERGENCE

In contrast to the above points of convergence between research on democratic transitions and on post-conflict peacebuilding, some broad patterns of divergence can also be identified. First, peacebuilders are generally more concerned with and optimistic about the role of international actors than democratization specialists. Much of the democratization literature postulates a limited role for international actors, or is overtly skeptical about international agency.¹⁶ Recent literature in the field of democratization has addressed global factors more seriously. Peacebuilding literature, on the other hand, is the purview of international relations specialists who often take for granted their focus on international actors. The international community is presumed to have a legitimate lead role in addressing the problems faced by societies emerging from war. Much of the literature seems focused on assisting policymakers (international, it often goes without saying) make their interventions more effective. The shape of the political reconstruction component of this "peacebuilding" intervention is modeled on Western liberal democracies.

Yet the hegemonic nature of these ideas in today's foreign policies deserves further scrutiny. As Gregory Fox points out in this issue, ideas about sovereignty and international intervention were radically different a century ago, when international involvement in matters of internal governance violated international legal norms of the day. Those norms privileged state sovereignty regardless of political regime type. The growing universality of human rights and the liberal democratic model has dramatically changed the field of international law since the Cold War with implications for societies in transition today. The question has become not whether, but to what extent, the international community will intervene in the peace process in a given society. Too often intervention is presumed to be uniformly positive, without sufficient attention to its potential negative consequences.

Here some of the democratization literature can contribute to peacebuilders' thinking. The democratization field has debated competing electoral models, competing ideas

¹⁵ Linz and Stepan, 1996, *op cit.* and Thomas Carothers, "The Rule of Law Revival," *Foreign Affairs* 77 (March-April 1998): 95-106.

¹⁶ Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992. Works drawing on Southern European and South American cases especially reflect the primacy of domestic factors. See, e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

about the balance of power among branches of government, the benefits of presidentialism versus parliamentarism, and many possible relationships between society, polity and state institutions.¹⁷ These unresolved debates offer a more nuanced and variegated vision of macro-political governance than most of the peacebuilding theory and practice presumes. In South Africa, top theorists engaged in extensive and lively debate with political leaders of that country about possible electoral systems. We have not seen this sort of open debate elsewhere, even where the international community held great influence in a failed state. Scholars of peacebuilding should explicitly engage these multiple models and options and the trade-offs and unforeseen consequences of their adoption. Moreover, exploring how these models of state-level governance may be adapted or discarded in light of longstanding patterns of authority and conflict resolution remains an under-recognized challenge.

Democratization theory has also addressed the question of centralization versus decentralization in transitions. Here is one area where an initiative aimed at furthering democracy can undermine the peace process, and vice versa. Both peace and democratization depend on ending warfare and preventing renewed warfare. Peace implementation, therefore, often seems to require empowering a central authority (usually the central government of a war-torn society) to exercise control over all legitimate means of violence. In short: no war termination, no democracy.

Yet decentralization is often seen as necessary to remove the excessive and often abusive power concentrated in a central government, granting voice and power to local and marginalized populations. Moreover, if local authority is more authoritarian than central authority, then decentralization undermines democratization. Decentralization must proceed with sensitivity to specific context, only in functional areas and in societies where decentralization is likely to foster participation and peace.¹⁸

Just as the peacebuilding literature has not fully engaged research on participation and democratization, the literature on democratization literature has paid scant attention to war and its aftermath. As Nancy Bermeo points out in this issue, the prominent works on democratization have acknowledged the role of war and its termination but have given it virtually no systematic treatment. Wars, especially global wars that transform the international order, have played an important role in the origins of many large democracies, from Germany and Japan to India, France, Argentina and the United States. In general the literature on democracies is rich with lessons learned and not learned. But consideration of these lessons does not mean blind acceptance. The conceptual challenge remains to ensure that governance at the local and national level of war-torn societies can be locally legitimate, supported and effective. Seeking out "bottom-up" approaches to post-conflict governance is something that neither international organizations nor local

¹⁷ Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems : A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.) *The Perils of Presidential Democracy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).

¹⁸ Rueschemeyer, *op cit*.

peacebuilding practitioners prioritize amidst their pressures to produce quick results with too few resources. Scholars of peacebuilding and democratization have not effectively laid a conceptual foundation for these efforts either. What are the gaps between these literatures, and what research agenda might address them?

GAPS IN THE PEACEBUILDING AND DEMOCRATIZATION LITERATURES

The initial challenge for scholars of “peacebuilding” is conceptual precision. The tremendously varied interpretations of this term make it difficult to see its utility. We endorse a broad, but delimited, definition of peacebuilding as “efforts to transform potentially violent social relations into sustainable peaceful relations and outcomes”.¹⁹ This definition includes “negative” and “positive” peace, and elite and non-elite approaches. It emphasizes what unites peacebuilding efforts empirically: efforts to avert violent conflict in ways that are self-sustaining. It emphasizes neither short-term peace maintenance nor the transformation of violence into non-violence (peacemaking). It is also more circumscribed than an overly broad definition encompassing the literature on peace, peacekeeping and civil wars.

A second conceptual gap concerns the nature of post-war societies. Peacebuilding should not be limited to “post-conflict” societies, even though this special issue emphasizes post-conflict peacebuilding. We are convinced of the utility of “post-conflict” as a concept, despite some scholars’ doubts given the many societies that confront seemingly chronic armed conflict. Ceasefires in some societies have represented undeniable points of historical salience, supporting the logic of examining “post-conflict” dynamics. Several factors distinguish post-conflict or post-intervention countries from non-postwar societies: a large number of demobilized combatants; a surfeit of small arms; the recent yet potentially reparable loss of infrastructure and other resources necessary for economic productivity; a social habituation to violent means of conflict resolution; massive displacement from hometowns; and the banality of hate as a motivating factor in everyday life often accompanied by war weariness. The large number of post-war democracies empirically justifies more attention to the dynamics of transitions from armed conflict, conceptually distinguishing these from transitions to democracy or other regime transitions.²⁰

However, the use of “post-conflict” must be contextualized. In some societies, displacement, violence and histories of declared warfare have prevailed for decades, and are not viewed as out of the ordinary or post-anything. The closer the features of purportedly “post-conflict” societies come to describing normal social conditions, the less useful the concept of “post-conflict”, and other concepts should be sought. These societies often have low levels of formal institutionalization, be they state agencies, civil

¹⁹ We draw on John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994), p. 14, but emphasize transformation of potential, rather than ongoing, violence.

²⁰ Charles T. Call, “War Transitions and the New Civilian Security in Latin America,” *Comparative Politics* 35,1 (October 2002): 1-20.

society organizations, or political parties. In contrast, where formal institutions such as states, judiciaries, civil society organizations and political parties prevail over informal institutions as the venues of power and social interaction, the concept of “post-conflict” is likely to be useful. We contend that the unique features of “post-conflict” societies should not be dismissed in these numerous circumstances.

A third conceptual gap for peacebuilding (one we ourselves are guilty of replicating) is that between the elite-focused processes and local-level, non-elite processes. Researchers are increasingly analyzing experiences at the community level, including training in conflict resolution, leadership development in conflict resolution, community dialogue initiatives, and peace conferences and commissions.²¹ Yet there are practically no efforts to synthesize knowledge about these local-level experiences with elite-level research on peacebuilding. Translating community-level experiences to broader national levels may help ensure that national level policies effectively respond to local realities. Greater integration of elite and non-elite peacebuilding practice and theory would benefit both.

A central challenge for research in post-conflict governance concerns the shortcomings of the democratic reconstruction model. If international and national resources are inadequate to implement this model, what alternatives remain? Ottaway argues that the post-war reconstruction standards should be more realistic.²² But what should be sacrificed within the democratic reconstruction model? Should organizations engaged in political reconstruction permit the exclusion of opposition candidates, the suppression of some rights of expression and assembly, the suspension of certain labor rights, the indefinite postponement of elections, the overt oppression of women, or the continued marginalization of ethnic groups? Abandonment of the Western democratic reconstruction model means substituting it with a different yardstick rooted in difficult choices.

Moreover, might upholding Western liberal standards, even where they are clearly unrealistic, end up advancing liberal political causes more than if such standards were never articulated? Frequently held up as one of the recent success stories of international peacebuilding and democratization, the case of Cambodia illustrates post-war dilemmas. Twenty years after 1.7 million people lost their lives under the Khmer Rouge’s brutal regime, the United Nations oversaw a peace process *cum* democratization effort in Cambodia. With over 20,000 military and civilian personnel deployed under the U.N.’s blue banner, and with a precedent-setting amount of money spent (US\$ 1.8 million), the U.N. set out to demobilize soldiers, de-mine the countryside, exercise political control of the country pending democratic elections, and foster a culture of human rights and accountability. The democratic reconstruction model was largely defined by this U.N. mission, at great expense.

²¹ See, e.g., John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1997); Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz (eds), *Peace-Building: A Field Guide* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001).

²² Marina Ottaway, paper presented at the Brown conference, *op cit*.

Cambodia illustrates the problems of the democratic reconstruction model. The U.N.'s four-year mission (1991-1995) failed to establish liberal democracy there, although it largely ended the war. The Khmer Rouge were not successfully demobilized or successfully integrated into the political process, and continued to oppose the government militarily until they were finally defeated in 1999. The elections held less than two years after the signing of the Paris Agreements were deemed "free and fair," but the sitting government did not respect the results and bullied the U.N. into ratifying a coalition government instead.²³ In 1998, the former government leaders ousted their democratically elected partners in a coup and remained in power as of this writing.

Yet Cambodia can also be an argument for retaining the high, if unrealistic, standards of the democratic reconstruction model. Some argue that Cambodia's human rights movement would never have achieved the consolidation it gained absent international insistence on universal democratic and human rights standards.²⁴ The press is arguably freer than it was before the U.N. process, and opposition political parties do exist, albeit often under duress.²⁵ In sum, the high standards for post-war democratization in Cambodia resulted in both failure and some improvements.

The Way Forward

In light of the experience of countries like Cambodia, how can post-conflict governance be improved? We offer some brief observations on governance and peacebuilding. First conceptual precision is imperative, and better comparative empirical work on different aspects of "peacebuilding" is in order. The sub-field reflects widely divergent notions of the concept, to the detriment of its advancement in utility. Second, policymakers need to take better advantage of a multiplicity of models studied and evaluated in developed countries as well as developing countries. These include existing understandings of Western democracies that have been overlooked, such as electoral schemes, party organization or elections timetables. National level leaders may rely upon governance arrangements they know or which benefit them at the cost of the public good. Too often planners from multilateral or bilateral donor agencies rely upon their own personal experiences of governance or on the anecdotal evidence provided by national counterparts, without engaging in a systematic process of discovery, assessment, and deliberation about different models of governance in conjunction with local and national actors.

²³ Sorpong Peou, "Implementing Cambodia's Peace Agreement" in Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens, *op cit.*; Michael W. Doyle, "Authority and elections in Cambodia," in *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, edited by Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

²⁴ Comments by Gregory Fox at the Brown University conference.

²⁵ John Marston, "Cambodian News Media in the UNTAC period and after," in *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peace-keeping*, edited by Steven Heder and Judy Ledgerwood (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996); and Cambodian Association for Human Rights and Development (ADHOC), "Cambodia: Emerging Civil Society Faces an Uncertain Future," report (http://iso.brichina.org:8151/old_site/topics/threefreedoms/cambodiasum.html).

Third, don't lower the bar of liberal, representative institutions; extend that bar out over time. Patience must be built into the fabric of post-conflict governance processes. Patience means holding elections when the conditions permit, perhaps five or six years after war termination, rather than on an artificial two-year timeline. Patience means greater reliance for an interim period on locally supported governance mechanisms, be they national or varied across localities. Patience means greater time to assist institutional development of society and state. Patience, of course, may cost more money. That cost raises the same question that Ottaway raises about the democratic reconstruction model: is it realistic? We believe it can be if interim arrangements rely on locally acceptable authority structures with a communicated endpoint.

Fourth, find ways to identify local voices and integrate them into decision-making. Again, idealism about local practices is dangerous, as these can be inimical to pluralism and individual rights. Yet numerous positive instances exist of incorporating local participation into national-level reconstruction processes. The World Bank has drawn on participatory appraisal methods to permit poor individuals to articulate their experiences and priorities, letting these perceptions drive conceptualization of violence and the development of appropriate policy responses from the state, from civil society, and from international donors.²⁶ In East Timor, a different World Bank "community empowerment project" linked local level development to empowerment of local voices in the setting of priorities for both political and economic policies affecting their communities.²⁷ The experience proved to be a useful endeavor at stimulating participation locally as a precursor to national elections. In the field of justice and the rule of law, Uvin and Mironko's case study of post-genocide Rwanda in this issue illustrates the problems with Western Weberian models, as well as the attraction of local-level alternatives. Unfortunately, international actors only reluctantly abandoned their focus on Western models of justice given the practical impossibility of speedy trials for 125,000 suspects.

Such experiences are not to be replicated, but illustrate ways in which participation can enhance governance in war-torn societies. Other examples of creative local-level initiatives abound, but have not been systematically catalogued or digested by research institutes or international organizations. Local or traditional forms of governance require difficult choices and perhaps the sacrifice of values liberals hold dear. Traditional, legitimate forms of authority are often repressive of women's rights, individual rights, property rights, minority rights, and other rights.

Yet the difficulties of bringing liberal democracy to most war-torn societies are apparent from experiences such as Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Careful,

²⁶ Caroline Moser, "Local Community Perceptions of Violence and Conflict: The Contribution of Participatory Appraisal Methodology." Paper presented at the Brown conference.

²⁷ Sofi Ospina and Tanja Hohe "Traditional Power Structures and the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project," report prepared for the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor and the World Bank, Dili, 2001.

critical exploration of traditional and non-traditional alternatives to a “cookie-cutter” post-conflict political package seems warranted. Using a process that incorporates all major social actors in determining appropriate governance structures seems imperative for policymakers.²⁸ Anthropological research and knowledge should prove useful here. And scholars can take greater advantage of ethnographic methods such as participatory appraisals, multiple and extended contacts, and mapping of social and political contexts for peacebuilding planning.²⁹ Similarly, policymakers can take greater advantage of the learning that is available and make an effort to *not* oversimplify choices, to privilege process over outcome, and to integrate multiple models with complex local realities.

²⁸ Chetan Kumar, “Conclusion,” in Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar, 2000.

²⁹ See Moser, *op cit.* and Kumar, *ibid.*